The goal of this web page is to ask the following questions, and perhaps hunt for some answers:

- The various different constructions of omega (e.g. J.H. Conway's based on his axiomatization of Dedekind sections) all yield one and the same 'omega'. Are there other constructions which yield different omegas or omega-like things?
- If not, is it because we merely do not know of any others, or can we somehow prove that no other constructions are possible?
- If there are other constructions, then is the ordering of the ordinals the same? It seems to be commonly assumed that the ordinals are well-ordered mostly because there is only one construction. Alternate constructions might yield different, unexpected orderings ...
- Conway's construction also includes the notion of 'gaps': in particular, he christens the 'gap' between all finite numbers and omega as 'infinity' oo. Naively, algebraic constructions involving oo are also possible; do these appear to always be self-consistent (and consistent with omega)?
- Are there 'gaps' between 'gaps', and how far can one go in that direction? Are the resulting constructs 'numbers', in that they can be well ordered, added, subtracted, multiplied, etc? Are there inconsistencies lurking?
- (and a classic question): what is the relationship between the ordinals and the continuum?

`Start with an enumerated list of numbers. Loop n=1 until omega: pick digit that differs from n'th digit of n'th enumerant. Put resulting number at beginning of list. Goto start.`

More broadly, suppose we could somehow effectively work with transfinite algorithms. Then various proofs fail: e.g. the halting problem, or proofs that make use of the diagonal slash. In particular, might this give a new way of looking at meta-mathematics & formalism?

Ordinarily, to be formal, one starts with a set of axioms and applies the rules of logic to derive theorems. Godel's incompleteness theorem states that there are true statements that are not provable. But maybe we should amend this with the qualification 'not provable in finite time'. Supposing that one could use this notion of writing algorithms that 'run forever, and then a bit more', then might not previously uncomputable problems become suitable for examination? The holy grail would be, of course, to compute Chaitin's fraction of finite turing machines that halt.

Of course, this is extremely dangerous territory; set theorists spend entire lives trying to replace an infinite sequence of theorems by one theorem, and religiously avoid infinitely long expressions; yet here, we advocate the very opposite. So this has all outward appearances of being 'crazy math'.

For example, consider the algorithm that counts to N, and then outputs whether N is even or odd. Asking whether omega is even or odd is nonsense, and so an algorithm that counted to infinity, and then determined 'even-ness' afterward, is somehow faulty. One must not be able to write algorithms such as this; but how can we distinguish such 'invalid' algorithms from the valid ones? Can we develop some rules that tell these apart?

- Axiomatic Set Theory
- http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/gt2.html (mirror) provides an excellent historical review of axiomatic set theory. Among other things, it reviews how Cantor came to construct the transfinite ordinal numbers.
- Continuum Hypothesis
- sci.math continuum FAQ
- Peano's Axioms
- http://www.torget.se/users/m/mauritz/math/num/peano.htm (mirror) lists the five Peano axioms.
- Zermelo-Fraenkel's system
- http://www.torget.se/users/m/mauritz/math/num/set.htm (mirror) Lists the seven axioms of set theory.

Copyright (c) 2001 Linas Vepstas