South Asia Analysis Group 


Paper no. 319

18. 09. 2001

  

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ROLLING JEHAD BACK

by B.Raman

"Mohammed's plea of guilty has focussed attention on the efforts of Pakistan and Afghanistan-based jehadi extremists to recruit members from the Muslim communities in North America and the Caribbean Islands to use them initially for operations against US interests in West Asia and then subsequently for promoting jehad in the US territory itself.

"The annual convention of the ISNA held at Columbus, Ohio, from September 11,1995, was addressed, amongst others, by Mr.Hamza Yusuf, an American citizen of Greek origin, who, after embracing Islam, had lived for six years in Mauritania to study Islam and then work as a TJ preacher, Mr. Yusuf Islam, formerly known as Cat Stevens, the famous pop singer, who embraced Islam after coming into contact with the TJ in Pakistan, Dr.Saghir of Algeria, and Dr.Israr Ahmed, the Amir of the Tanzeem Islami of Pakistan and a worker of the TJ.

"Addressing the convention, Dr. Israr Ahmed said: "The process of the revival of Islam in different parts of the world is real.  A final show-down between the Muslim world and the non-Muslim world, which has been captured by the Jews, would soon take place. The Gulf war was just a rehearsal for the coming conflict."  He appealed to the Muslims of the world, including those in the USA, to prepare themselves for the coming conflict.

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The above-reproduced paras have been extracted from an article by this author written on October 20,2000, which was carried by the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), New Delhi, the next day under the title "Islamic Jehad and the US" (www.saag.org/papers2/paper154.html ) and by the "Business Line", a daily newspaper of Chennai, on November 7,2000, under the title "Taking Jehad To the US".

The Pakistan and Afghanistan-based jehadists have since taken their jehad to the US. This is not the culmination of their efforts, but only the beginning of a new phase of it.

Reports from Washington create misgivings in the minds of professionals with some knowledge of counter-terrorism that the main focus of the American deliberations at various levels has been on the various options for retaliation.

Certain points, which need to figure in any such deliberations, do not figure in the reports from the US:

* International jehadi groups in general and the International Islamic Front For Jehad against the US and Israel, headed by Osama bin Laden, in particular, are known for their forward-thinking and meticulous planning. When the Front and its constituents decided to carry out an operation of this nature, they would, most probably, have been mentally prepared for a US retaliation and planned for counter-retaliatory operations.  It is important for a group of experts to put themselves into the irrational mindset of the terrorists and think of various options that might occur to them.  One should prepare in advance necessary protective measures to pre-empt counter-retaliation by the terrorists.

* The operational component of counter-terrorism has two aspects---passive and active defence.  Passive defence is protecting yourself, your infrastructure etc from any strikes or counter-retaliatory strikes of the terrorists through appropriate physical security measures. Active defence is retaliation in an appropriate manner.  Only after detailed enquiries one would know how the terrorists managed to strike undetected on September 11, but, even now, one could be fairly certain that they succeeded because of inadequate intelligence production, weak intelligence analysis and inadequate physical security.  The deficiencies have to be identified and rectified before going into the active defence mode.

The Day of Infamy in New York and Washington DC on September 11 is a wake-up call for all nations grappling with the menace of externally-directed terrorism.  More so for India. 

Security agencies all over the world had been concerned since the middle 1990s over the possibility of the following three potentially catastrophic future scenarios, which they call new or catastrophic terrorism:

* First, the use of or threat to use weapons of mass disruption (e.g. a computer virus) to damage or destroy the national security, economic, communications, energy and other vital supplies infrastructures.

* Second, the use of or threat to use weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

* Third, seizing control of sensitive installations such as nuclear reactors and using them as bargaining chips to force the State to concede their demands.

These concerns were the outcome of the Sarin gas attack by the Om Shinrikiyo sect in Tokyo in 1995 and subsequent interviews given by Osama bin Laden in which he had expressed an interest in the procurement of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons.

However, none of the scenarios discussed in the past had visualised the type of horrendous attacks mounted by the terrorists on September 11.  But irrational and fanatical minds think alike.  A Sikh terrorist arrested in the early 1990s had stated that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had suggested to the terrorists the possibility of crashing a plane into the Mumbai High platform.  Mumbai---March,1993, was the seed from which New York and Washington DC--2001 was born.

In the third and final part of its report on National Security during the 21st Century released in February,2001, a bipartisan Commission led by former US Senators Warren B. Rudman and Gary Hart had called for the creation of a Cabinet-level agency to assume responsibility for defending the US against the increasing likelihood of terrorist attacks in the country.  The report warned that terrorists probably will attack the US with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons at some point within the next 25 years.

The Commission proposed a complete redesign of the National Guard to provide a new "Homeland Security Agency" with U.S.-based troops to combat those who threatened the US within its territory.  It outlined a far-reaching reorganization of the Pentagon, the State Department, the National Security Council and other agencies, saying that they had become bloated and unfocused.  Its report even urged Congress to streamline its own committee structure to keep interference in national security matters to the minimum necessary.

The Commission recommended merging the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Customs Service, the Border Patrol and the Coast Guard into the new "Homeland Security Agency." It said that the National Guard should be "reorganized, properly trained and adequately equipped" to cope with natural disasters and attacks on U.S. targets by weapons of mass destruction.  The Commission said that the National Guard should be relieved of the responsibility of participating in overseas deployments and concentrate on security at home.

The report said: "The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the US homeland to catastrophic attack.  A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century.  The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine US global leadership.  In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures."

US Congressmen have attributed the failure of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to give advance warnings of the September 11 attacks to its over-focus on technical intelligence (TECHINT) to the detriment of human intelligence (HUMINT). The catastrophic terrorist groups of today, exemplified by the Al Qaeda of bin Laden, do not always use modern technologies.  For the World Trade Centre bombing in February, 1993, and for the bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August,1998, his supporters did not use modern explosives.  They used, instead, a large quantity of nitrate fertilisers , which anybody can buy in the market without creating suspicion.

They stick to old communication technologies to avoid detection.  Ever since the US bombing of his training camps in Afghanistan in October 1998, bin Laden has been largely using couriers and avoiding the use of his mobile (satellite) phone lest the Cruise missiles zero in on the phone.

Unless the HUMINT capability is stepped up, advance warnings of such catastrophic terrorist acts is going to be increasingly difficult.  Like the CIA, the Indian Intelligence Community has also been strong in TECHINT, but weak in HUMINT.  Unless this is set right, our preventive capability would be weak.

Catastrophic terrorism demands a multi-agency approach, with all counter-terrorism divisions of various agencies working under a common roof, under common leadership, with a common national purpose.  This came into force in other countries many years ago.  India has only just now woken up to the need for it.

Deaths are no longer counted in dozens, but in thousands.  Old crisis management drills evolved to meet conventional threats such as hijacking, hostage-taking etc will no longer meet the horrendous threats of today.

India's crisis management was found wanting even during the classic IAC hijacking of December,1999.  Does our security bureaucracy have the capability to prevent catastrophic terrorism and deal competently with the catastrophe, if its preventive mechanism fails? This is a question, which needs urgent attention.

Terrorist networks of today are becoming increasingly autonomous in their functioning with their dependence on their State-sponsors reduced by the easy availability of narcotics dollars and weapons and explosives, which they can buy from the flourishing smugglers' market with the narcotics money.

The non-State actor terrorists of today tend to group together in united fronts in order to assist each other in their operations.  bin Laden's International Islamic Front for Jehad against the US and Israel brings together nearly a dozen Islamic terrorist organisations of different countries.  It is a hydra-headed monster.

Under such circumstances, a counter proxy war strategy by India has to be directed not only against a State-sponsor such as Pakistan, but also against the various non-State actors operating from Pakistani territory, who may not be totally under its control.

Terrorism is the core component of Pakistan's proxy war against India.  It is politically overt, but operationally covert.  Even though international law and practice give us the right of active defence against Pakistan, we have not exercised it even once.  We do not have even after so many years a credible counter proxy war strategy to demonstrate to Pakistan that its proxy war will not be cost-free.

Nations, which become incapable of feeling a sense of indignation and anger when attacked and let their will and readiness to retaliate, when warranted by circumstances, be weakened by misplaced forbearance add one more head to such monsters.

To be able to wage a counter proxy war, our intelligence community needs a strong covert action capability.  It has a capability , but it has not been nurtured by the political leadership, which hesitates to use it in our national interests, whatever be the international pressure on us not to do so. 

The networking of the terrorists has not been matched by a networking of the victim-States.  There has been a mushrooming of intelligence-sharing mechanisms, but without visible improvement in the ground situation.

An equally important factor has been the lack of a lucid analysis of the dimensions of the new menace and the absence of a political will to strike.  One hopes that the present will to take up the challenge posed by the terrorists would not be weakened after some time due to political considerations, as often happens.  Terrorism is an absolute evil and has to be treated as such.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: corde@vsnl.com )

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