South Asia Analysis Group 


Paper no. 318

17. 09. 2001

  

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MUSHARRAF ORDERS SCRAM

by B.Raman

Reports from Pakistan indicate that on September 12,2001, within 24 hours of the jehadi terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC, Gen.Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's self-reinstated Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), self-styled Chief Executive and self-promoted President, after consulting his Corps Commanders, ordered an emergency scram to evacuate from the Taliban-controlled Afghan territory, all Pakistani Govt. personnel, serving as well as retired, serving in the Taliban's militia, civil administration and intelligence agency, and all jehadis belonging to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Al Badr undergoing training in the training camps in Afghan territory.

Airports, including the one in Islamabad, were temporarily closed for traffic to enable the evacuation by air from Kabul and Kandahar of all senior Army officers, serving and retired, serving in the Taliban.  Under the UN sanctions, there is a ban on all flights to and from the Taliban-controlled territory.  Despite this, Musharraf and his officers decided to take a risk by evacuating the senior officers by air.

All junior officers and civilian personnel have been ordered to return to Pakistan by road as best as they can.  Similar instructions have been issued to the jehadis undergoing training in Afghan territory, preparatory to their induction into Jammu & Kashmir.

It is said that nearly 70 per cent of the planned evacuation has been completed and the current visit of a high-level Pakistani delegation to Kabul/Kandahar ostensibly to pressurise Mulla Mohammad Omer, the Amir of the Taliban, to hand over Osama bin Laden to the US or to an European country within three days, is at least partly meant to gain some more time to complete the evacuation of Pakistani Government personnel and the jehadis.

It seems that there has been no evacuation, either actual or ordered, of the Pakistani students of the various madrasas in Pakistan, most of them belonging to Maulana Fazlur Rahman's Jamaat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI), who have been fighting along with the Taliban Militia against the Northern Alliance troops.

They seem to have been asked to stay on and continue to assist the Taliban Militia. Islamabad's military junta is worried that the evacuation of the Pakistani Army personnel and any disruption of the Taliban's Militia set-up by US air strikes, if they take place, might enable the Northern Alliance to re-capture Kabul and other territory lost to the Taliban since September,1996.

This was one of the subjects discussed by the Corps Commanders' conference.  The junta is worried that if the Taliban's resistance against the Northern Alliance collapses and the Burhanuddin Rabbani Government returns to power in Kabul, it would be strongly anti-Pakistan and pro-India, pro-Russia and pro-Iran.  It wants to prevent this from happening.  One possibility is of the JUI and other organisations being asked to rush more of their members to the front to join in resisting the Northern Alliance.

Another desperate possibility is Musharraf offering to President Bush to send his own troops to occupy Kabul and other areas now under the control of the Taliban.

The junta's present mission to Kabul/Kandahar to pressurise the Taliban leadership to rid itself of bin Laden does not appear to be sincere.  The junta is nervous that if bin Laden lands in the custody of the US he might confess to the US authorities, during interrogation, the details of his terrorist links with the Pakistani military/ISI leadership. The junta's likely preference would, therefore, be to have him killed instead of letting him fall into the hands of the US.

In the meanwhile, bin Laden, his body guards, and his family members are believed to have scattered away from Kandahar.  Their present whereabouts are not known. There are three possibilities:

* Either they may cross over into the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and take shelter there; or

* They may join the current exodus of refugees from Afghanistan into Pakistan and take shelter in the refugee camps; or

* They may take refuge in the network of tunnels, which bin Laden, a reputed civil engineer of Saudi Arabia before he joined the Afghan jehad, had constructed in the Afghan territory to help the Mujahideen.  During the Afghan war of the 1980s, the Mujahideen used these tunnels, with deadly effect, to launch hit and hide attacks on Soviet ground troops.

The following points are not yet clear:

* The likely fate of the eight foreign humanitarian workers of the Shelter Now International---two Americans, two Australians and four Germans---who were under custody and trial in Kabul.  Would the US launch an air strike on Kabul despite their being detained there?

* To what extent would any US ground operations be hampered by the presence of a large number of mines planted during the Afghan war, many of which have not yet been deactivated.  As of now, any ground operations by the US seem unlikely in view of Pakistan's reluctance to permit them.

In case, the US decides to launch a reprisal attack, a possibly workable plan for the US would be:

* Softening of the Taliban's ground positions by focussed air strikes followed by;

* Assistance to the Northern Alliance, through air support, to advance and occupy Kabul and Jalalabad and from there hunt for Osama bin Laden, without the US troops directly getting involved in the hunt.  The Northern Alliance hates bin Laden for having got Ahmed Shah Masood assassinated and would be only too happy to hunt for him and his advisers and hand them over to the US.

The US might be committing a serious error of judgement if it puts its eggs, even some of them, in the Musharraf basket. 

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of india, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com )

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