UNITED STATES STRATEGIC OVER-EVALUATION OF PAKISTAN
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
United States political involvement in South Asia for over half a
century stands singularly marked by a strategic over-evaluation of
Pakistan. This has led not only to distortion in America’s South
Asian policies but also facilitated the intrusive presence of China in
South Asia.
United States today alarmingly views South Asia as a nuclear
flash-point after nuclear weaponisation by India and Pakistan. Such
American perceptions arise more from a reading of Pakistan as a
politically unstable state, its unpredictability and Pakistan’s
irresponsible political and nuclear stances. But then, the moot
question is as to who created the Pakistani nuclear monster? The blame
rests squarely on China for providing nuclear weapon designs, nuclear components for making the bomb and supplying nuclear-capable
missiles to Pakistan. The blame also rests more squarely on the
United States, for its permissive attitudes to the Chinese nuclear weapons
and missile supplies to Pakistan. The United States strategic
over-evaluation of Pakistan led to such permissive American policies.
South Asia analysts have heard ‘ad-nauseam’, statements in every
American presidential administration by political leaders, politicians,
officials and spokesmen speaking of Pakistan in glowing terms as "an
enduring ally of long standing" and a strategic contributor to United
States' national interests in the region.
Today, when United States finds itself at strategic cross-roads in
virtually all the strategic regions of the world, it becomes relevant to
analyse Pakistan’s record as "an enduring ally of long
standing" and its strategic contribution to United States national
interests in the region.
Cold War’s Early Years: The United States more out of pique,
resulting from India’s lack of response to join the Western security
alliances, drew Pakistan into a military embrace. Pakistan, soon
after its emergence from the partition of India, had signaled its
readiness and solicited United States military aid from the United States.
Pakistan’s ‘quid-pro-quo’ was to join every conceivable military
alliance system sponsored by the United States and the West.
Pakistan thus became a member of the Baghdad Pact, later CENTO and then
SEATO. Pakistan’s only contribution to the United States during
this period was to permit operation of US spy flights (U-2 planes) from
Peshawar. These too were stopped in 1962 after Soviet warnings.
During the early Cold War years, Pakistan as an "enduring
ally" of the United States did not contribute anything to furtherance
of American interests in the Islamic World (one of US strategic
expectations) or the Middle East. As a SEATO ally of the United
States, Pakistan did not contribute directly or indirectly, to assist the
United States in Vietnam. This was in sharp contrast to other SEATO
members like Thailand and Philippines.
Cold War’s Later Years: Pakistan had shied away from the United
States from 1962 onwards. Events of the mid 1960s and early 1970s
drove Pakistan into violent anti-US outrages including the burning of the
US Embassy in Islamabad in the late 1970's. These were hardly the
responses expected from an "enduring ally" of the United States
"of long standing".
The United States did not undertake any initiatives to enliven or
reinforce its relationship with Pakistan during this period.
The Afghanistan War: The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979
helped jump-start the United States-Pakistan strategic relationship, for
different motives though. The United States wanted to do a
"Vietnam" on the Soviet Union and there was no better way than
to "Islamise" the resistance against the Russians. Pakistan was
ready to exploit the situation and offered itself as a spring-board for
the United States proxy war in Afghanistan.
The United States "enduring ally of long standing" did not
contribute any military resources (men or materiel) to the US effort in
Afghanistan. On the contrary, it extracted from the United States $4
billion military aid against a non-existent military threat; it siphoned
off more than 60% of US arms and ammunition for the Islamic Jehad to
Pakistan armouries and it put into operation a vast network of
narco-terrorism apparatus for provision of funds to its intelligence
agencies like the ISI.
If Pakistan had strategically contributed to US national interests
during these years, United States today would not have been faced with the
scourge of the Talibanised Afghanistan and Islamic Jehad against homeland
USA itself.
The Gulf War: Following the end of Cold War in 1989, the United
States had to resort to a massive military operation in 1990-1991 against
Iraq’s military intervention in Kuwait. United States used the UN
flag to draw in traditional allies from Europe and Islamic allies from the
Middle East, namely, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt and even an
anti-US state like Syria.
Where was United States "enduring ally of long standing"?
Pakistan did not join the United States during the Gulf War. It made
a token contribution of a battalion each to go and defend "the holy
places of Islam" (Mecca and Medina). A preposterous proposition
as if President Saddam Hussein would have attacked Mecca and Medina. The
Pakistan Chief of Army Staff, then, General Mirza Aslam Beg openly
criticised and opposed the United States for initiating the Gulf
War. Pakistan’s record in the Gulf War was hardly the one expected
of a United States ally.
United States Current Strategic Expectations from Pakistan: United
States, currently as the global uni-polar power, realistically, should not
have much strategic expectations from a country the size and potential of
Pakistan. The United States has far many more options available to
further its national interests.
Pakistan’s well-wishers in the United States comprising Cold War
warriors of earlier era, however keep advancing the following strategic
factors promotive of Pakistan: (1) Pakistan provides a link and outlet for
the United States in Central Asia (2) Pakistan as a ‘moderate’ Islamic
state could promote US interests in the Islamic World (3) Pakistan could
keep Afghanistan under control (4) US does not want a Talibanised
Pakistan (5) Pakistan could help US oil companies to build their pipelines
from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan to Gwadur port on the Makran coast
in Pakistan (6) Some US analysts also argue that a military strong
Pakistan with nuclear weapons could rein-in India’s long-term strategic
ambitions.
Can Pakistan Deliver?: Pakistan in its current state has been
dubbed by many US analysts as a ‘failed state’ or ‘failing state’.
It also has been dubbed by them as a "rogue nuclear state" or
modified into "states of concern". Talibanisation, today,
stares Pakistan in its face and the economy is at breaking point.
Pakistan is in no state to deliver to the United States, the strategic
expectations American Cold War warriors would like to cite in its
favour. On the contrary Pakistan itself needs to be delivered from
the paralytic attack of Islamic fundamentalism and Talibanisation
engulfing it.
Analytically, Pakistan has no foothold in Central Asia to advance US
interests. Pakistan is perceived in that region as the factory of
Islamic Jehad threatening them. In the Islamic World, the United
States has better and stable allies to advance its interests, like Turkey
and Egypt. Pakistan has lost control over the Taliban in
Afghanistan; their tentacles are now spreading to take over
Pakistan. Much to US dislike, better oil pipeline routes are
available through Iran. Turkey is a still better option.
Lastly, any long term strategic evaluation by US policy makers of
building Pakistan as a counter-weight to India is grossly faulty.
India as a good learner, could follow the United States model during the
Cold War of beating USSR out of existence by imposition of an unaffordable
arms race. India could similarly impose an unbeatable conventional
arms-race on Pakistan to off-set such designs. Pakistan cannot,
therefore, deliver in this field.
Conclusion: Pakistan stands strategically over-evaluated by United
States foreign policy planners and strategists. Pakistan even in earlier
years, when it was relatively more stable and moderate, made insignificant
strategic contributions to US national interests.
Pakistan’s military hierarchy which would continue to call the shots
in any political dispensation are a totally different breed from what
United States officials dealt with during earlier military regimes.
Pak military hierarchy and the bulk of Pakistan Army today is highly
Islamised (fundamentalist attitudes). They are not US-friendly today
and hence unlikely to serve US interests.
United States national interests in Central Asia, Middle East, South
Asia and South-West Asia face strategic challenges from Islamic
fundamentalists and terrorists. Pakistan can hardly emerge as United
States’ strategic ally to confront such challenges. In fact, it may
emerge as a challenge itself.
The United States needs to re-valuate its strategic evaluation of
Pakistan and of its relationship. What is increasingly becoming
apparent, on analysis, is that Pakistan is likely to emerge as a
"black-mailing state" on the North Korean model, preying on
United States fears of Pakistan’s nuclear unpredictability and
irresponsibility.
(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and
Strategic Affairs analyst. He can be reached on e-mail for
discussion at esdecom@vsnl.com)
