South Asia Analysis Group 


Paper no. 303

28. 08. 2001

  

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UNITED STATES REVERSES GEARS IN SOUTH ASIA

by Dr. Subhash Kapila

The paper expresses the personal views of the author.  May be read with (1) Indo-US Strategic Partnership: The Advent of the Inevitable www.saag.org/papers2/paper120.html
(2)United States Policies in South Asia Under Bush: Continuity is expected www.saag.org/papers2/paper181.html
(3) United States and the Agra Summit www.saag.org/papers3/paper291.html

The turn of the millennium heralded a significant change in the tenor of United States - India relations. From estranged democracies, the path seemed to lead towards engagement without misgivings. This was signaled during the historic visit by President Clinton to India in March 2000. The joint declaration i.e. "India-US Relations :A Vision for the 21st Century" incorporated two important statements ‘Natural partnership of shared endeavours’ and significantly that ‘In many ways the character of the 21st century will depend on the success of our cooperation for peace, prosperity, democracy and freedom’.

India reciprocated the above spirit when during his visit to the United States in September 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee termed India and United States as being "natural allies" which drew bi-partisan support both in India and the United States.

American think-tanks and noted American foreign policy analysts  stressed: (1) Bi-partisan consensus existed in USA for better relations with India (2) Better US-India relationship was emerging not from individual preferences, but from increasing convergence of interests and more significantly (3) Fundamental changes had taken place in US perceptions of India. India was no longer seen as confined to South Asia but central to Asian balance of power.

With the advent of the Republican Bush Administration in January 2001, with no adverse developments having taken place to sour US-India relations, India hoped and so analysed by analysts like this author that the Bush Administration would : (1) Continue to reflect the bi-partisan support in USA for a better and broader US-India relationship (2) In keeping with the past Republican Administrations of President Reagan and President Bush Sr build upon the pre-eminent status of India in South Asia and (3) Contemporaneous review of Asia-Pacific security environment by Bush Administration would lead to adding value to US-India strategic convergence of interests.(paper181 refers)

Notwithstanding visits of Bush Administration luminaries to India during this year, recent statements emanating out of Washington officialdom and leaders, somehow seem to negate the promising trend in US-India relation outlined above. More meaningfully are the changing nuances of the Bush Administration on United States policies towards China and Pakistan as discernible to analysts like us. At the outset it needs to be emphasised that while the United States can afford the luxury of viewing its relationships with China and Pakistan, independently of India, the latter cannot do so. China and Pakistan, independently and in collusion have weighed heavily in India’s strategic calculus for over half a century. India cannot be oblivious to their conflictual record so far. US policies on China and Pakistan therefore impact on India’s security.

From India’s viewpoint, American statements, moves and developments emerging from the Bush Administration which cause disquiet and indicate a trend-in-the-making (hopefully not) pertain to Kashmir, state sponsored terrorism, Pakistan, China and the overall vision of the US-India relationship.

United States Changes Tack on Kashmir: President Bush Sr (Republican) before laying down office, reiterated in 1991 that Kashmir was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan and needs to be resolved within the purview of the Simla Agreement (1972). President Clinton (Democrat) despite his earlier indifference, realised realistically towards the end of his tenure that not only Kashmir was a bi-lateral issue but also that for peace in South Asia, the sanctity of the LOC had to be respected by Pakistan. It was this realisation which made President Clinton to call on Pakistan to call off its aggressive misadventure in Kargil in 1999 and withdraw Pak forces to its own side of the LOC. Therefore, in the last decade under both the Republican and Democratic Administrations, the policy of endorsement of the Simla Agreement(1972) and respecting the sanctity of LOC in J&K stood unchanged. (Paper No 291 refers)

Any third party mediation or interference on Kashmir is ruled out by US bi-partisan policy stances. Further, it is repugnant to India. If that be so what was the necessity of US Secretary of State, General Colin Powell’s offer to "lend the good offices" of USA on this issue.

Change of tack, like the above are not conducive to promote trust and faith in India in United States motives and intentions. No wonder Indian analysts termed it as "not only outrageous and unwarranted, but out of context".

It would have been advisable to adhere to the US endorsements on the Kashmir issue by former President Bush Sr and President Clinton. They effectively discarded the Cold War dictated tenets of America’s stands on Kashmir.

Irrespective of Indian Government stances, the Indian masses have an intense sensitivity and strong opinions on Kashmir. Any change of tack in American policies in terms of endorsement of the Simla Agreement (1972) and respect for the sanctity of LAC by Pakistan, is likely to arouse strong anti-American sentiments in India.

United States Disappointing Responses to State Sponsored Terrorism: Indians stand aghast at the verbal camouflage that United States resorts to and takes refuge in while over-looking Pakistan’s active role in unleashing Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in J&K and ISI sabotage all over India. While United States is ready to launch Cruise missiles against Osama-bin-Laden’s camps in Afghanistan, it shies away from condemning Pakistan, the cess-pool of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism not only against India, but the United States too.

Indians are appalled at statements emanating from Washington officialdom on this crucial issue when daily scores of innocent lives are being lost because of Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism. Here is a sampling of the latest statements from Washington officialdom carried in the issue of India Abroad of August 17, 2001.

Harry Thomas, Director South Asia, in the present US National Security Council, (served in New Delhi under US Ambassador Frank Wisner, for 3 years) while briefing a group of Indian-Americans at the White House stated that naming Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism would make it a failed state and lead to its Talibanisation. Further, he noted: "I am very sympathetic to the victims of terrorism. It’s a stretch to say the Government of Pakistan is a state sponsor of international terrorism."

Another US official is quoted as stating: "Just because a terrorist organisation is based or operating from Pakistan does not necessarily mean Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism".

Obviously, it is statements like the above which stretch United States credibility to breaking point and stoke anti-American sentiments in India. It also makes that much more difficult the task of any Indian Government wishing to promote better US-India relations. Further, the United States should not expect India to co-operate and assist in global counter-terrorism efforts, if they are intended to serve areas of concerns of the United States only. Any joint counter-terrorism efforts should address India’s concerns too, more specifically Islamic Jehadi Terrorism in J&K.

Bush Administration Softens On Pakistan: United States perceptions on Pakistan may currently be centred on: (1) Pakistan should not be allowed to disintegrate into a failed state (2) Pakistan is crucial to furthering US interests in Central Asia (3) Pakistan Should be prevented from being Talibanised and (4) Pakistan should be kept engaged to keep its nuclear waywardness under restraint (Paper No 181)

Laudable objectives for United States policy interests, but the question that begs an answer is as to how India is responsible for or contributing to Pakistan’s disintegration, Talibanisation or nuclear waywardness? It is Pakistan’s misgovernance, its Islamic fundamentalist policies, its China fuelled nuclear weapons and missiles build-up and its self-acquired and self-professed role as crusader of pan-Islamic causes which have contributed to its present state - held together by military rule of Islamic fundamentalist Generals.

Pakistan has strong supporters in the Cold War oriented civilian bureaucracy of the United States Department of Defence (Pentagon) and also in a sizeable number of US Senators and Congressmen funded by Pakistan Govt and Pakistan expatriates in USA. No wonder it led to a Washington despatch covering Condoleeza Rice’s views (Sadiq Ahmed, Washington, The Bush Effect, Outlook, Dec 25, 2000, p39) stating that Pak lobby in USA could undermine efforts by Bush Administration to achieve a higher degree of compatibility with New Delhi. Bush Administration’s softening towards Pakistan can be gauged from: (1) According legitimacy to the military dictator of Pakistan, General Musharraf, via Indian proxy i.e. the Agra Summit (Paper No 291 refers) (2) Permissive attitude towards Pakistan’s policies of state-sponsored terrorism against India (3) Reversing of President Clinton’s hard line US policies towards Pakistan (4) Facilitating monetary tranches from the IMF and World Bank to Pakistan on the plea that General Musharraf is attempting to restore democracy.

That the United states is attempting at a resurrection of its relationship with Pakistan is well exemplified by the statements of Peter Rodman, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs (Times of India, August23, 2001, p10 quotes) "Our relationship with Pakistan is valuable to us. And I don’t think this Administration is going to lose sight of that..... but Pakistan has been an ally over many decades. I don’t think , we as a great power, should be dispensing with allies, when you know that we think conditions have changed. Its an Islamic country in a very complicated region of the world. I think it is useful to have a friend in that part of the world".

The above stands in a significant contrast to a RAND Report authored by Zalmay Khalilzad (former Assistant Secretary, Defence in President Bush Sr Administration) which sought from President Bush Jr Administration: (1) President Bush Jr to urge Pakistan to exercise restraint on Kashmir (2) Pakistan "is in serious crisis and is pursuing policies counter to US interests" and (3) De-couple India and Pakistan.

The sudden softening of US policy stance towards Pakistan is currently being attributed to oil politics of the Caspian Region, the proposed oil-pipelines through Afghanistan and Pakistan’s leverage over the Taliban in Afghanistan. What is being implied in these formulations is uncharitable towards the Bush Administration, but then it is the Bush Administration that has to disabuse the minds of analysts that its intentions are otherwise.

By any stretch of imagination, today, Pakistan is neither placed nor equipped to further United States strategic interests in the Middle East or Central Asia. To maintain that Pakistan as an Islamic country is better placed to serve American interests in these regions is a facile argument. The Gulf War dispelled the myths of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic unity.

Bush Administration Gets Permissive on China: Like the Clinton Administration, President Bush during the run-up to elections was hard on China. Yet within eight months, his Administration has become as permissive towards China as were his predecessors. The change is significantly notable in terms of nuclear missiles proliferation in South Asia. CIA reports recently indicated that China had shipped a sizeable number of Shaheen I and Shaheen II missiles to Pakistan by the land route i.e. via the Karakoram Highway. The CIA had also authentically indicated that China had passed along solid propulsion missile technology in recent months. The US responses to this serious violation of MTCR by China have been as permissive as the previous Administration.

These permissive reactions i.e. absence of any sanctions against China, as per US laws, are in marked contrast to what the current US national Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice stated in December 2000 that China is a security concern for USA because Beijing transfers technology for weapons of mass destruction to Iran and Pakistan.

The United States has a historical narcisstic obsession for China, which India can do nothing about . But where China does impinge on India’s national security interests and to which sensitivity the United States should be alive to is China’s nuclear weapons and missiles build up of Pakistan with Chinese off-the-self sales, supplies of components in  knocked-down kits and transfer of blue prints and technology.

United States official permissiveness on this aspect cannot but be perforce construed as complicity in harming India’s national security . Indians have strong feelings on such complicity and permissiveness of China’s attempts to strategically de-stabilise India by proxy through Pakistan.

United States Distorts Over-all Vision of United States -India Relationship: India through its Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee indicated it vision of United States -India relationship in September 2000 at the Asia Society dinner on September7. When it was declared "we feel as do our policy makers that India and the United States are natural allies." There could not be a more visionary statement concerning the US-India relationship nor a more convincing commitment.

President Bush Jr. himself echoed similar sentiments during the presentation of credentials by India’s Ambassador, Lalit Mansingh in June 2000. President Bush stated that "After years of estrangement, India and United States together surrendered to reality. They recognised an unavoidable fact-they are destined to have a qualitatively different and better relationship than in the past."

In marked contrast to the promising vision espoused by the Indian and American leaders, the statements emanating from Washington’s officialdom were disappointing. Peter Rodman, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs recently stated (Times of India, August 23,2001): "Our relationship with India is different, but Pakistan has been an ally over many decades....India is not going to become an ally of the United States. I think India values its independence. It values its non-alignment. So I don’t think that anybody should expect that India is going to collude with us." It would be wrong for any US Administration official or political leader to distort the overall vision of the US-India relationship as given out in the New Delhi Joint Declaration of March 2000 which spoke of "cooperation for peace, prosperity, democracy and freedom." The said declaration did not enshrine "collusion" or "alliance" as prevalent in the mind-sets of the leftover "Cold War Warriors" of Washington.

Conclusion: India is neither in a position nor inclined to pass judgements or dictate what US foreign policies should be towards any region or country of the world. However, India  perceiving itself as a partner in a cooperative endeavour as enshrined in the New Delhi Joint Declaration of March 2000, would expect that the vision so envisaged by both nations moves along the endorsed lines and policies followed so far. United States policies towards building a more broader framework of relations, enjoying bi-partisan political support, should not be put in reverse gear because of political or individual predelictions.

The United States, in my view has very difficult options in South Asia. It cannot have "balanced and strong relations with both countries (India and Pakistan)" as US Secretary of State, General Powell said after the failed Agra Summit. United States should recognise the reality (and China should follow suit) that external balancing of India’s natural pre-eminence and power i.e. by aiding Pakistan has been historically fruitless.

In the years to come neither the United States nor China can hope to restrict India within South Asian boundaries or be held a captive in the region by the Sino-Pak collusion. One cannot help but borrow what Sunanda K Datta Ray states in a recent issue of the ASIAWEEK (August 24, 2000 P 18) : "But don’t expect India to become America’s tame kitten. The country will resist its efforts to limit its freedom of action in the sub-continent or in pursuit of what it sees as a legitimate global status." India like China in the 1980s despite any perceived weakness, is today in a position to play the "India Card".  For those like this author who have hoped for a " Indo-Us Strategic Partnership "as an Advent of the Inevitable" fervently hope that the United States , does not reverse the gear.

(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst.  He can be reached on e-mail for discussion at esdecom@vsnl.com)

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