South Asia Analysis Group 


Paper no.273

08. 07. 2001

  

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SUMMIT: The shadow of Sattar & Aziz

by B.Raman

The shadow cast by Abdul Sattar, Pakistani Foreign Minister, and Lt.Gen.Mohammed Aziz, a Corps Commander at Lahore, over the forthcoming summit meeting at Agra between Mr.A.B.Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, and Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the self-styled Chief Executive and self-promoted President of Pakistan, is getting deeper and darker.

We had earlier mentioned that Sattar had been sulking because:

* Most of the preliminary work in connection with the summit had been got done by Maj.Gen. (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, former station chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Washington and an active member of the Belusa group of Mrs.Shirin Tahir-Kheli, through Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi, without Sattar being kept in the picture.  Durrani works from the office of the so-called Chief Executive.

* Sattar was not totally in the picture regarding the visit of George Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to Islamabad during which he (Tenet) had an unusually long meeting with Musharraf.

After the acceptance of the Indian Prime Minister's invitation by Musharraf, during the period of his intensive interactions with political, religious and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) leaders, in disregard of the views of Sattar that such interactions were not required, the Foreign Minister was mostly away from the country---initially on a visit to the UK, Canada and the US and, subsequently, to Mali to attend a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).  In Mali, he was reported to have met Mirwaiz Umar Farooq of the Hurriyat .

During this period, the programme of Musharraf in India was being finalised by the Chief Executive's office in consultation with Qazi, with the Pakistani Foreign Office playing very little role in the matter.  It was during these consultations between the Chief Executive's office and Qazi that the question of inviting the Hurriyat leaders to the high tea to be hosted by Qazi in honour of Musharraf in the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi came up for examination.

Qazi was reported to have drawn the attention of Musharraf to the sensitivities of the Government of India on this subject.  It was reportedly decided that they should not be invited, that Musharraf should not meet the Hurriyat leaders, that the meeting of Sattar with Umar Farooq should suffice for the time being and that Qazi should suitably explain the position to the Hurriyat.

Musharraf's action in allegedly succumbing to the pressure of India on this issue came in for strong criticism from some sections of the Ulema and the POK leaders.  The strong statement of Yasin Malik, of the J.K.Liberation Front, criticising Pakistan for allegedly letting down the Kashmiris was noted with concern in the Pakistan Foreign Office.  To assuage the anger of the Hurriyat, Musharraf had invited some representatives of the Hurriyat, operating from Pakistan, to his interactions with the POK leaders and had also indicated that before going to India he would be meeting, possibly in POK, the leaders of the United Jihad Council, headed by Syed Salahuddin, Pakistan-based leader of the Hizbul Mujahideen, to reassure them that there was no change in Pakistan's attitude towards the Hurriyat and in its stance on Kashmir.

Since his return from abroad, Sattar had reportedly been strongly criticising the reluctance to invite the Hurriyat leaders to the High Commissioner's tea in deference to the sensitivities of the Govt. of India and insisting that Musharraf should meet them during his stay in New Delhi, either by inviting them to the tea party or by inviting them separately if he did not want to embarrass the Indian leaders and officials who might be coming for the tea party.

It is believed that Lt.Gen.Aziz, who has reportedly been advising the Hurriyat and the jihadis against any moderation of their anti-India rhetoric or any slow-down of their activities, also strongly supported the point of view of Sattar.  It is said that as a result, Musharraf changed his mind in favour of a meeting with the Hurriyat leaders in New Delhi, even at the risk of his action irritating the Indian leadership.

Political observers in Islamabad also see the hand of Sattar in the virulently anti-India statement on the alleged violations of human rights in Kashmir issued by the Pakistan Foreign Office on the night of July 6.  It is not known whether Sattar authorised this statement on his own or in consultation with Musharraf.

Ever since the Prime Minister invited Musharraf, Sattar has been blowing hot and cold, vitiating the pre-summit atmosphere.  Before going to the UK, Canada and the US, he made a strong statement against India at a press conference in Peshawar.  However, his statements in the US relating to India and the Kashmir issue were moderate by his normally vitriolic standards.  After his return from abroad too, he has avoided any statements in his name which might be interpreted as calculated to vitiate the atmosphere, but seems to be active behind the scenes to make Musharraf adopt a more confrontational stance on issues such as the Hurriyat, alleged violations of human rights in Kashmir etc.

There is so far no evidence to indicate that Sattar and Lt.Gen.Aziz have any support for their hardline, confrontational stance from other senior army officers or Cabinet members.  Speculation, which was rife after the take-over of Musharraf as the President, that Lt.Gen. Muzaffar Usmani, Deputy Chief of the Army Staff (DCAS), was also siding with Aziz, has not been corroborated.  Usmani has been actively associated by Musharraf with the summit preparations.

As of now, Sattar and Aziz seem to be in an isolated minority of two.  It is still a mystery as to why Musharraf does not call them to order or ease or throw them out.  On the contrary, Musharraf seems to have been prevailed upon by Sattar not to make any change in the present policy of no normalisation of the trade relations with India till the Kashmir issue is resolved. 

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com )

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