India - Pakistan Agra Summit 2001:
The imponderables
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
In the history of India-Pakistan relationship the Agra Summit between
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf
(July 14-16, 2001) has emerged as the most over-analysed event in the
recent times. In a way, rightly so, because the antagonistic and
combative confrontation of the last 53 years has not brought about any
solution to the contentious issues. This is a fact which Pakistan has yet
to admit as the prime initiator of wars and proxy wars in South Asia.
Imperatives for peace between India and Pakistan, therefore exist but to
achieve peace, it takes two to do the tango.
The compulsions which have prompted both India and Pakistan stand
over-analysed in the media and various seminars that have abounded in the
last two months or so. They do not deserve repetition here. The pious
hopes for peace emerging in South Asia from the Agra Summit is a laudable
aspiration but in this yearning for peace, serious analysts of the India-Pakistan scene cannot afford to ignore the imponderables that hover over
this Summit and which cannot be wished away.
Historical Baggage: The historical baggage that each side will
carry to the Summit is heavy and cannot easily be jettisoned. Mutual
suspicions and distrust between the two countries does not arise from
Kashmir. Kashmir is only the symptom of the larger disease i.e. the
centuries old Hindu-Muslim divide. What is of recent origin is Pakistan’s
irreconcilable attitude of accepting Pakistan’s asymmetrical status
vis-a vis India in South Asia- politically, economically and militarily.
India can do very little in this matter. Pakistan has to come to grips
with this reality.
International Pressures: The United States has exerted immense
pressure in bringing India and Pakistan to the negotiation table. The
flurry of open visits of senior US officials to both countries and vice
versa in the preceding period are indicative of this pressure. The US
pressure arises not from any pious intention to bring peace in South Asia but
from the larger strategic requirements of USA to bail out Pakistan from
its descent into Islamic fundamentalism and Talibanisation. Pakistan has
once again emerged as a ‘front-line’ state in the US strategy for its
Central Asian policies. The danger for India arises in that the United
States in the event of lack of substantial progress at the Agra Summit may push
hard for third party mediation or an enlarged international summit to
address the issue. India must be prepared to counter such pressures.
Agra Summit - A Continuum or New Beginning? This is a basic
fundamental divide existing in India-Pakistan perceptions. India believes
and maintains that the Agra Summit must be viewed as a continuum of the
Simla Agreement and the Lahore Accords, both of which emphasised the need
for bilateralism in resolution of conflicts and the maintenance of peace
by both sides. President Musharraf comes to Agra Summit with the tainted
record of Kargil which was a repudiation of both accords. Expectedly, he
has maintained and will continue to maintain at the Agra Summit, that any peace
negotiations have to begin afresh divorced from the Simla Agreement and
Lahore Accord. It is difficult to visualise how India will pin-down
President on this account.
Pakistan Army & The ISI Factor: Many learned Indian pundits are
maintaining that the Pakistan Army is a very disciplined force and will
acquiesce with any peaceful initiative that will be arrived at between the
Vajpayee-Musharraf duo. Since nothing substantial on Kashmir is likely to
emerge at the Agra Summit because of entrenched position of both sides,
the Pakistan Army and ISI are unlikely to give up the proxy war in
Kashmir. Conversely, it may suit their vested interests not to let peace
emerge at the Agra Summit, should Musharraf in pursuance of his ‘man of
destiny’ ambition feel so inclined. Musharraf would be hard
pressed to ignore Pakistan Army & the ISI on these issues.
China’s Role of Spoiler: Peace in South Asia and any
re-conciliation in India-Pakistan relations runs contrary to China’s
strategic interests in South Asia though China seems to have altered tack on Kashmir
in recent years. This arose more from the dangers of the principle of
self-determination then also being applied to Tibet and Xinjiang.
In pursuance of China's strategic aims it has a vested interest in spoiling the chances of peace
emerging from the Agra Summit, in any dramatic manner. The ISI and a
strong clique of pro-China Pak army generals would be the instruments for
such Chinese spoiling attempts. It is being said that the trio of Pak
Army generals who brought Musharraf to power are the ones with the
strongest links with China.
Vajpayee-Musharraf Competing Backgrounds: At the Agra Summit, the
two leaders attempting a dialogue and reconciliation between India and
Pakistan come with stark competing backgrounds. India is represented by a
man of peace, an idealist in the Nehruvian mould, a poet given to musing.
Pakistan will be represented by a man of war, who only two years ago
launched Kargil war on India and who has done precious little to stop the
proxy war in J&K state. The cessation of shelling and firing on the
LOC by Musharraf was not a confidence building measure. It was to restrain
India from continuance of its pro-active policy of artillery shelling deep
into PoK. It was also because Pakistan could not bear the economic costs
and depletion of its strategic reserves of ammunition. Pakistan could not
afford the attrition. With such different backgrounds and psychological
conditioning, it is difficult to visualise how the two leaders could
compete to bring peace to South Asia.
Media Hype: In strange contrast to Pakistan, India has witnessed an
alarmingly disproportionate media hype. Media pundits may argue that the
Pakistani media is restrained because they view Musharraf as an usurper.
This is a partial excuse. Pak media is restrained, because perhaps
realistically, it assesses that nothing much can be expected from the Agra
Summit.
Concluding Observations: The Agra Summit, two weeks hence, could be
optimistically viewed as useful provided Pakistan and President Musharraf
view it as a continuum of the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Accord.
Devoid of this, President Musharraf’s coming to Agra can only be viewed
as a tactical ploy to bail out Pakistan from its current international
isolation and not as a strategic aspiration for the promotion of peace
between India and Pakistan. The central issue at the Agra Summit cannot
be Kashmir, Siachen or cessation of Islamic terrorism in J&K and the
rest of India. The fundamental issue at the Agra Summit for Pakistan
should be to re-define its historically-riven and traditionally
conditioned attitudes to India, from suspicion to trust.
(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and
Strategic Affairs analyst. He can be reached on e-mail for discussion at esdecom@vsnl.com)
