South Asia Analysis Group 


Paper no.263

26. 06. 2001

  

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BJP & Electoral Politics: Problems faced in expanding the social base

by R.Upadhyay

K.Jana Krishnamurthy, the national president of the BJP in a recent press interview (Times of India dated June 18, 2001) said that his first priority "is to further strengthen the party, expanding its social, organisational and electoral base" and prepare the party to face the challenges of future Assembly /Lok-Sabha elections.  Krishnamurthy, with his long association with RSS since 1940 and politics for last 35 years has realised the problem faced by his party.  Though, his statement to expand the party base gives the impression that the BJP has already acquired a social base, the ground reality is otherwise.  The BJP never had a solid social base covering a vide spectrum.  The base if any, is only the trading community.

To understand the real problem of the Hindu nationalists and their political outfit BJP or its ideological mentor, the RSS, we may look back to the strategy attempted by them for political unification of the caste ridden Hindu society.  The social order in ancient Hindu society was basically a system of "Varna Vyavastha", which meant that castes were exclusively the four fold occupational units.  But a thousand years of the subjugation and aggressive governance of Hindus by the rulers of alien cultures created a chaotic situation in the society, which gradually turned them into a large number of sub-castes linked to their birth.  Political unification of such a large number of castes against the changing social order with a restless and ever growing population and social conflicts particularly after the destruction of village economy at the hands of the Britishers, is a Herculean task.

Reminding the Hindu Samaj of their glorious past under cultural/spiritual unity was not an attractive slogan to transform the feudal social order into an egalitarian society of ancient India.  Contrary to it, castes became a potent factor in the fragmentation of Hindu society.  Against such a fragmented social order of Hindu society, the RSS initiated a move to unify them on the basis of the cultural unity of the Hindus.  Article 3 of the RSS constitution says,

 "The aims and objects of the Sangh are to weld together the diverse groups within the Hindu Samaj and revitalise and re-juvinate the same on the basis of its Dharma and Sanskriti, that it may achieve an all-sided development of Bharatvarsh."( Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh by D.R.Goyal, page 257 ). 

Despite the potential in the logic of the glorious Hindu past given by the Hindu  nationalists, the ideology did not attract the lower castes.  The caste barrier of Hindu Samaj required a forceful reform movement in rural India for which no serious attempts were made by the RSS.

Mahatma Gandhi took up the challenge of the political unification of fragmented Hindu society against the Britishers through social movements, which created an impact.  The key to his success was that he focussed on rural India.  His 20,000 Km Harijan Yatra from Vardha to Varanasi in 1932 in nine months against untouchability, created a tremendous effect in involving the down trodden and humiliated section of the lowest ladder of Hindu society in a political struggle against the Britishers.  His Namak Satyagrah from Champaran district in Bihar, which was one of the most backward areas of the country and similar movement against indigo cultivation were also against the exploitation of the lower castes of rural India.

Gandhi and Ambedkar fought against untouchability and caste system respectively with a view to free the Hindu society from the bondage of such social evils.  But the post-independence ruling elite under the leadership of Congress used the caste as their vote banks for electoral gains.  Thus, this caste based electoral politics of the then ruling class adversely affected the move of the Hindu nationalists to unify the fragmented Hindus.  The RSS on the other hand was branded by its political opponents as a Hindu chauvinistic and fascist organisation.  They also accused them for their alleged attempt to re-establish the Brahmanical order in Hindu society with a view to impose the political hegemony of upper caste particularly the Brahmins in the country.  Dalits in rural India were given the wrong impression that the move was a fresh attempt against the Dalit movements launched by Mahatma Gandhi and Ambedkar.

Ironically, the blame for the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948 was put on the shoulders of the RSS by its opponents even though the court did not endorse this view. Mahatma Gandhi had a reputation of a Messiah among the lower castes in the villages. His assassination followed by a ban by the Government on RSS therefore, further alienated the lower castes in rural India from the Hindu nationalists.  Perhaps the casual approach of the RSS leadership in tackling this problem kept the major chunk of Hindu society known as OBCs and Dalits, who constitute about seventy percent of the Hindu population away from them.  The upper castes, particularly the Brahmins were in fore front of freedom movement and became the ruling class under the umbrella of Congress and therefore became its natural vote bank after independence

Theoretically, the ideology with majoritarian politics may sound logical but in the absence of any vibrant movement against the prevailing social order and economic disparity and lack of their penetration in rural India particularly among the lower castes, political unification call of Hindu nationalists for the fragmented Hindu society remained a far cry. The RSS did not make any attempt to develop any feed back channel in rural India to gauge the mindset of village folk.  The idea of Hindutva could not be sold in rural India, having 80% of country’s population. which is the backbone of Hindu society, in which castes became the symbol of class.   No serious attempt was ever made by the forces of Hindutva to transform the caste-ridden rural India into the ideology of Hindu nationalism and as a result no solid social base required for electoral politics could be created by them.

The political out fit of the Hindu nationalists, which started its journey in Indian polity under the banner of the BJS in 1951, which was reborn as BJP in 1980 could not change the situation as far as the expansion of the ideological base of the party is concerned.  They had to face the political challenge of a highly aggregating party, Congress, which had been a broad based coalition of different interests, classes and religious as well as caste groups.  Inheriting the legacy of Mahatma Gandhi, the Congress could create a solid ideological support base in rural India and convert it into a vote bank for the party. With a solid caste group of Brahmins, Dalits and Muslims and divided opposition, the Congress could rule over the country, hardly facing any electoral challenge for long years.  

What Mahatma Gandhi could achieve by creating a strong social base for the Congress within fifteen years by mobilising the Harijans in favour of the party, the Hindu nationalists could not do it in the last seventy-five years.  The BJP incorporated the philosophy of Gandhian socialism in its political ideology but it hardly took any lesson from his Harijan movement from rural India.  The post-Mandal scenario and the magnitude of unending reservation for Dalits and backward castes further aggravated the caste conflicts in Hindu society.  The growth of caste organisations, as seen in recent conferences of various castes and the on going power struggle among the upper castes, OBCs and Dalits, have torn the social fabric of Hindu society into pieces with no possibility of its repair in the near future.

Though, the BJP could manage power at centre in the closing decade of twentieth century and is ruling the country for the  last three years as head of the coalition Government, it failed to expand with a nation-wide ideological support base.  Though their target covers 85% Hindus, the BJP with the support of the forces of Hindutva, which have been working for over last seventy five years- has not been able to increase its share of voting percentage above 25.47 in 1998 Lok Sabha election, which was further reduced to 23.75 in 1999.

Due to its narrow support base, which by and large is confined to the upper castes of Hindi speaking states of north India and western states of Gujarat and Maharashtra, the BJP leadership had to make an ideological compromise with their junior regional partners for the sake of power.  At the same time, regional forces did not allow them to expand their social base in their respective regions for obvious reasons.  Telegu Desam in Andhra Pradesh, the Dravidian parties in Tamilnadu, Biju Janata Dal in Orissa, Lok Dal in Haryana, Akali Dal in Punjab and Trinamool Congress in West Bengal never gave reasonable space to the BJP in their states.  Besides, the central leadership of the BJP kept the state leadership of the party subdued and demoralised due to the pressure of the regional partners in the coalition.

Under the prevailing political scenario in the country, both the Congress and the BJP are the primary contestants for political power at centre.  To grab the space occupied by the Congress, the BJP raised some emotional issue like Ram Temple at Ayodhya and achieved some short term political gains by the closing decades of twentieth century.  But these could only be transitory and the gradual increase in the aspiration for sharing political power among the different caste groups, is going against the consolidation of Hindutva movement.

It is not clear what strategy the BJP is going to adopt, to expand its social base.  Unless it makes a determined initiative to expand in the rural areas, where 80% of Indian population lives and win over the lower caste, there is no possibility of BJP expanding its social base.

( The analysis is based on the personal perception of the writer.  E-mail: ramashray6o@yahoo.com)

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