South Asia Analysis Group 


Paper no.250

29. 05. 2001

  

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INDIA’S CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF: a perspective analysis

by Dr. Subhash Kapila

The views expressed are those of the author - Director

India’s National Security Review: Successive Indian Government in the last 53 years paid lip service to a review of India’s national security requirements in terms of higher organisational structures and roles. Any serious effort was stymied by the entrenched civilian bureaucracy which was opposed to let go their bureaucratic control of the armed forces and especially defence procurement.  Preying on Nehru’s suspicions of Indian Armed Forces, the civilian bureaucracy by an innocuous government note on May 27, 1952 declared the Armed Forces Headquarters as "attached office" of the Defence Ministry.  In one stroke the bureaucracy divested the Armed Forces Headquarters of policy-making roles as the Government manual of office procedures decreed that while Ministry of Defence could make policy, their "attached offices" merely implemented it. [1] The BJP Govt’s National Security Review declared on May 11, 2001 was a bold path-breaking step, especially in terms of acceptance of the requirement of a Chief of Defence Staff(CDS) for India.

Significance of Review: The noted defence analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, himself a former bureaucrat highlights the significance of this review by giving credit to the present Government on three counts:[2]

* The Government broke the taboo of 53 years on review of national security matters.  This precedent will enable periodic reviews in the future.

* The reform process of national security requirements was preceded by intense debate at political level.  This has helped in "cutting through the Gordian knot of sequential bureaucratic nitpicking and consequent delays."

* Recommendations and supporting arguments of the review are being published.  This will add to transparency in discussion of India’s national security matters.

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)- Role Envisaged By The Government: Detailed charter of duties of the CDS has yet to be spelt out by the Government.  Media reports convey that the role of the CDS envisaged by the Government is:[3]

* CDS will be the single-point military advisor to the Government from any of the three Services and will be of four-star rank.

* CDS will head India’s Strategic Forces Command as well as the tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command

* The most important peace-time job would be to reconcile budgetary and equipment demands of the three services.

Chief of Defence Staff: Role Determinants: While many models of the role of CDS exist in Western democracies, India’s strategic environment and requirements are different. While these models can serve as guidelines, the Government has to bear in mind the following determinants of the role of India’s CDS:

* Strategic and defence expertise still remains in the domain exclusively of the uniformed fraternity, despite the growing emergence of civilian experts in the academic field.

* India’s land borders and threats are predominantly land-based and oriented. Despite technological advances India’s defence requirements would be man-power extensive based on the Indian Army.

*The Indian working ethos is hierarchical based. It does not admit the Western concept of ‘first amongst equals’.

* India’s strategic weaknesses that have emerged in the wars since 1947 centre on lack of war preparedness, poor intelligence and crippling processing of defence requirements.

* Internal security threats are overtaking requirements of defence against armed aggression. These entail extensive use of the Indian Army during peace time in internal security operations.

Ideal Role of the Indian Chief of Defence Staff: The above determinants and other lessons of the past in India’s strategic shortcomings would suggest that the ideal role for India’s CDS should incorporate:

* CDS should have the primary role of being the Principal Advisor to the Prime Minister and the Government through the Defence Minister on all matters pertaining to India’s national security in the spheres of strategy and strategic planning, both conventional and nuclear. In effect he should be on par with the National Security Adviser in terms of access to the Prime Minister.

* CDS should provide ‘strategic vision’ and be responsible for all strategic perspective planning, operational planning and contingency planning. This would stipulate that the CDS should not be weighed down by any day-to-day administrative responsibilities pertaining to the three Services.

* In peace-time, the primary role of CDS should focus exclusively on war preparedness and internal security operations having a bearing on strategic operations.

* In terms of war preparedness, the CDS should have a major role in refinement and integration of operational plans, creation of logistic means to sustain operational plans and ensuring build-up of strategic reserves of arms, ammunition, military hardware, supplies and fuel requirements.

* Procurement should not rest with the CDS as this would weigh him down with bureaucratic and administrative requirements. This would distract him from the primary roles outlined above.

* The CDS should prepare the annual National Intelligence Estimate and the requirements of national intelligence to meet the existent threats, overall.

* The CDS rightly has been envisaged as heading the Strategic Forces Command and the Andamans and Nicobar Command and any other tri-service commands that may evolve in the future.

* The CDS has to be viewed as the ‘Head’ of the Indian Armed Forces in terms of providing strategic control, strategic direction and strategic vision, even though each Service Chief continues to head his respective service as hither to fore.

* CDS should have the primary role in formulation of defence policies.

Rank of the Chief of Defence Staff: After taking a bold and innovatory step of reviewing the national security structures, the present Govt. like its predecessors has shied away from giving a proper rank to the CDS commensurate with the roles. It seems that the Group of Ministers have been subjected once again to civilian bureaucratic pressure. There is no justifiable reason why the CDS should not be of five-star rank. It behoves the world’s third largest armed forces to have a five-star officer as the ‘Head’. Also as pointed out earlier, the Indian work culture does not admit the Western principle of ‘first amongst equals’.

Selection of Chief of Defence Staff: Principles outlined below, if followed in the selection of CDS, could help in the evolution of an effective CDS system in India:

* Present structure, size of each service, predominant land-based threats and internal security threats dictate that the CDS for some time should be from the Indian Army.

* The CDS should be the "brightest spark" in the Indian Armed Forces hierarchy. Hence seniority should not be the criteria for selection. Qualities of comprehensive intellectual brilliance, imaginative strategic vision and innovation should be the determining criteria in selection. Audacity in vision would be an important criterion.

* Selection of the CDS should be from two panels of three names each. One panel should be made by a Group of Ministers and the other panel should be called for from the incumbent CDS.

* The civil bureaucracy should not be associated with the selection of the CDS.

Chief of Defence Staff System: Organisation Set-up and Links: Evolution, with experience of obstacles and impediments initially faced, can only come up with right answers to the organisational set-up and links for the CDS system. Presently, one can only dwell on some important principles that should be borne in mind in the initial stages, namely:

* CDS should not emerge as another super military bureaucrat. CDS should be left free to visualise and plan for the future.

* CDS is envisaged as the single-point Principal Strategic Adviser to the Prime Minister through the Defence Minister. His organisational set-up and links are therefore clear.

* By no stretch of imagination can the Defence Secretary be re-designated as "Principal Security Adviser." Some other designation has to be found for him in the Integrated Defence Ministry envisaged.

* The CDS should not be subservient to the National Security Council. His role should be advisory and of providing another view on strategic matters.

* The CDS should have a compact tri-service Secretariat, independent of the Defence Ministry, and capable of perspective planning roles.

Concluding Comments: The decision to appoint a CDS, despite bureaucratic opposition is a bold and innovative step taken by the present Government. In the same spirit, the Government should not allow the creation of the CDS appointment to be mired in controversy either by opposition from civilian sources or from within the Services. Initial organisation set-ups and links should be termed and viewed as experimental and to be reviewed every three years, until the near ideal system relevant to the Indian strategic environment emerges.

The Indian Armed Forces and the historic creation of the CDS appointment should never be allowed to be politicised. India owes a national debt of honour to its Armed Forces for their contributions in nation building of a newly emergent India. They did not go the way of the other armies in becoming political - by choice and not by compulsion. The Indian Armed Forces have proved to be most crucial pillar of the State.

India could borrow some thoughts from Australia as to how Armed Forces should be viewed. The Australian White Paper on Defence, 2000, states "The Armed Forces are not simply a service provided by the Government . They are part of Australia’s national identity." The Indian Armed Forces too have proved in ample measure in the last 53 years that they are part of India’s identity, and more than simply a service.

(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He can be reached on e-mail for discussion at esdecom@vsnl.com)

Notes:

1. See The Times of India, May 18, 2001, Government Business Supplement Page I (box)

2. Ibid. Page I "A Milestone in Decision Making" by K. Subrahmanyam.

3. Ibid. Also see ‘Public Eye’, K. Subrahmanyam "Who Says India does not need a Defence Chief" Page VIII

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