Asia - Pacific Security :
China Invited
NMD & TMD
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
China today depicts national characteristics similar to those of
imperial Germany of 1900: "the sense of wounded pride and the
annoyance of a giant that has been battered and cheated by the rest of the
world." [1] Building
on this an American academic made two pertinent observations: [2]
* This historical background prodded China into a major military
modernisation program.
* This military ‘enchantment’ was further fuelled by domestic
political imperatives to unify China through nationalist symbols. It
also helped stabilise the Chinese leadership political base.
It is ironic that China’s explosive economic growth was fuelled by
United States and Japanese investments which have led to the creation on
China’s aggressive and intimidatory military might in the Asia Pacific.
China military build-up and modernisation would have been perceived as
legitimate for a nation rising from its unfortunate past, had it not been
accompanied by China’s propensity for :
* Armed conflicts as in Korea, Vietnam, the Sino-India war and border
clashes with USSR.
* Sponsoring, aiding and abetting insurgencies in the Asia-Pacific.
* Creating military equipment client states in the Middle East, South
Asia, South East Asia and North East Asia.
China also went in for a sizeable build-up of its nuclear weapons and
missiles arsenal and indulged further in nuclear weapon and missile
anarchy to destabilise the existing precarious regional and global
stability in these fields. These deserve a detailed examination to
understand why China brought the NMD (National Missile Defence) and
TMD (Theatre Missile Defence) shields coming as responses to its
unpredictable strategic policies. It would also help appreciate how
unconvincing the Chinese arguments are against the planned deployment of
NMD and TMD.
China’s Global and Regional Nuclear Weapons and Missile Threat
The chronology of China’s build-up of its nuclear weapons arsenal is
well chronicled.. In the past twenty-five years China has upgraded
both the power and precision of its nuclear weapons with a concurrent
sophistication of its delivery systems. China, alone amongst the nuclear
powers continued systematic nuclear weapons testing in the 1990.
Forecasting for 2000 then, China was assessed that it would have cruise
missiles and elaborate space-based defence system.[3]
China’s global and regional nuclear weapons and Missiles threat is
generated by the following arsenal:
* Nuclear warheads for its missiles for -as per 1993 estimates to
total 300 [4]. Present
estimates are however around 450-500.
* By 2120, China could have 50-70 ICBMs capable of global coverage
including USA [5]
* Two mobile ICBMs: DF31 (range 5000 miles) and BF41 (range 7500
miles) are in advanced stage of development [6]
* Current inventory consists of :[7]
- ICBMs 15-20
-IRBM 66
-SLBMs 1 Xia SSBN with 12 Css-N3)
- SRBMs 150
-Bombers 120 H6 (nuclear capable)
China has expanded its wish list of the above threats by acquiring
technologies for Cruise Missiles similar to the American TOMOHAWK and also
GPS Systems for ensuring greater accuracy of missiles.[8]
The Chinese nuclear threat in terms of the size of arsenal is growing.
It is said that : [9]
* Size of China’s nuclear force becomes largely a matter of will,
not capability.
* China can afford a major expansion of its missile force.
* China has the capability of producing 10-12 ICBM per year
With China having both the will and the finances the Chinese nuclear
force is likely to grow. More so when China is not amenable to any
restraints.
Stimulii for NMD and TMD: China’s Nuclear Weapons and Missiles
Anarchy
China had the NMD and TMD coming its way in response to its nuclear
weapons and missiles anarchy that its has inflicted both globally and
regionally. (Major points of China’s anarchical behaviour to be
considered are:)
* China has viewed nuclear weapons and missiles not as weapons of
deterrence but as political tools of coercion and pressure, globally and
regionally. Thus China has provided nuclear weapons and missiles to
proxy failing states to strategically de-stabilse its potential
regional rivals e.g. Pakistan and North Korea in relation to
India and Japan. [10]
* China has used the same method in the Middle East to supply nuclear
technology and missiles to states adversarial to the United States.
China since 1990s can be said to be using the Middle East as a counter
pressure point against USA in relation to military supplies to Taiwan.
* China violated all its NTPT, MCTR commitments while indulging is
such WMD proliferation.
* China is engaged in a major upgradation of its nuclear and missile
arsenals, while the big league nations of USA and Russia are cutting
down their arsenals.
* China is threatening the "freedom of the high seas" in
South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits with an implied nuclear missile
buildup e.g. massing of SRBMs opposite Taiwan. Currently 300 are
deployed.
* China’s "DF-21 missiles are deployed from bases where they
can threaten Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines and India.
With the assistance of PLA Navy tracking ships, DF-21 missiles also
could be used to attack US Navy carrier task groups. From China’s
Hainan Island in the South China Sea, DF-21 missiles could counter US
naval forces transiting the Straits of Malacca. [11]
* China to date has not shown any inclination to join any nuclear
arms control discussions.
China’s Objections to the NMD
China’s opposition to the NMD were outlined officially by Ambassador
Sha Zhu Kang, Director
General, Arms Control and disarmament Deptt., in the Chinese Foreign
Ministry on March 15. The gist of his arguments were as under: [12]
* China is opposed to NMD for two basic reasons:
- NMD not in interest of international peace and security
- NMD compromises China’s security .
* NMD will disrupt existing strategic equilibrium among major powers.
* NMD will become a force multiplier for USA.
* NMD will increase the weight of the military factor in
international relations.
* NMD will strengthen US unilateralism.
* NMD will hamper international arms control and disarmament.
* NMD will trigger a new arms race.
* TMD as a forward component of NMD in Asia -Pacific security.
* China is prepared to use force to safeguard its sovereignty.
The NMD and TMD are basically anti-missile defence systems. NMD is
aimed at defending USA mainland against missile threats from any quarter.
It is designed to ensure that USA is freed from USA mainland defence to
react to any military conflict anywhere. TMD is planned as a regional
forward component in the Asia-Pacific for missile defence of its regional
allies, basically Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Philippines.
In light of the above, China’s objections to NMD and TMD as
officially spelt out seem unconvincing. Both these systems are basically
shield against hostile missile attacks against USA and its allies in the
Asia Pacific. Not being offensive missile systems targeted at Chinese
sites, they in no way are a military threat to China and its mainland
territory. Contrary to China’s views, international peace and security
would be strengthened in the Asia Pacific, as none of the regional states
on which Asia-Pacific security hinges, namely Japan, South Korea, Taiwan
and Philippines would be vulnerable to any nuclear and Missile
coercion by China and North Korea.
USA is committed to the provision of a ‘nuclear umbrella’ to Japan
and South Korea. TMD provides this. Wthout the ‘nuclear umbrella’ of
USA Japan and South Korea could be tempted to develop their independent
nuclear deterrent in relation to China.
China’s major under-lying objection and fear is that the development
of NMD and TMD would dilute or negate China’s nuclear deterrence i.e.
its second strike nuclear capability.
Conclusion
China’s anarchic policies in terms of nuclear weapons and missile
proliferation have been a major stimulii in the emergence of the NMD and
TMD. Even at the height of the Cold War no such responses emerged for the
simple reason that despite their confrontation USA and USSR could sit down
and discuss contentions issues without any historical baggage and
perceived insults. In course of time both USA and USSR could see reason
and discuss arms control as opposed to disarmament.
The same cannot be said of China for the following reasons: [13]
* China consistently over the years has avoided negotiated
constraints on its nuclear arsenal and delivery means.
* In 1980s, China stated it could not discuss this until superpowers
reduced their nuclear arsenal by 50 percent.
* On Russia and USA cutting down their nuclear weapons by 60%, China
switched to arguing that before talks can commence, Russia and USA
should slash their arsenals to China’s levels i.e. 400-500 level.
China with such evasive stances can hardly expect that its objections
on NMD and TMD can be taken seriously. On the contrary such stances
reinforce the case for NMD and TMD deployment on the premise that China is
feverishly engaged in the expansion of its nuclear arsenal to the reduced
levels of those of USA and Russia.
NMD and TMD are thus legitimate responses to a China whose nuclear
arsenal is not only expanding but a liable to anarchical use . China’s
security concerns can only be respected internationally when it learns to
accord respect to the security concerns of others.
Notes:
1. Nichols D Kristoff, "The Rise
of China" in foreign affairs November/December 1993. P72
2. Kent E. Calder, "Asia’s
Deadly Triangle", London, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 1996, P121
3. Ibid P72
4. "Chinese Nuclear and
Conventional Forces 1993", Arms Control Today, December 1993. P29
5. Stephen Hutcheon, "China May
Set off Another Nuclear Test Next Week", Sydney Morning Herald,
August 11, 1995.P11
6. "Backgrounder", Asian
Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation, Washington "Building a More
Secure Asia Through Missile Defence", No 138 dated October 25, 1995
P2
7. "MILITARY BALANCE, 2000"
P186-189.
8. Brad Roberts, Robert A Manning and
Ronald N Montaparti "China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power" in
"Foreign Affairs" vol 79 July-August 2000 P55
9. Ibid P57
10. Dr. Subhash Kapila, "
Japan-India Strategic Cooperation: A Perspective Analysis: South Asia
Analysis Group Paper dated 13 June 2000 P5. See for a more detailed
analysis.
11. "BACKGROUNDER", The
Heritage Foundation (1995). See Note 6 above P4
Also see David A Fulghun and Michael Meecham in "Chinese Tests Stun
Neighbours", Aviation Science and Space Technology, July 31 1995.
P23.
12. Xinhua despatch dated March 15,
2001 in Embassy of China (PRC) New Delhi, news letter "News From
China" Volume XIII No 12 dated March 21, 2001.
13. "Foreign Affairs", see
reference at Note 8. P62-63.
