PAKISTAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE ARSENAL: Development and Acquisition Philosophy
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
The decade of the 1990s witnessed the dramatic emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear
weaponisation programme that had begun in 1960's. It would have been logical to expect
that a missile delivery programme for its nuclear weapons would be conducted concurrently.
However, the outlines of an integrated Pakistani missile development plan began to appear
only in the 1980s, though experimentation with sound ranging rockets had begun in the
earlier decade.
Pakistan’s missile programme is termed as dramatic because
in a short span commencing in 1991 this country has demonstrated the development of a long
range potent missile arsenal with nuclear warhead capabilities. When measured against
Pakistan’s technological expertise, industrial infrastructure and hi-tech R&D
capabilities, it becomes obvious that Pakistan’s missile arsenal has come into being
with total external assistance and aid.
Strategically, at the turn of the millennium, Pakistan can
justifiably boast that not only has it offset India’s overwhelming conventional
superiority by its nuclear weaponisation , but also has outstripped India’s missile
development programmes which have proceeded slowly both due to domestic and external
restraints.
Pakistan Missile Development /Acquisition Programme - The
Stimulus
Multiple stimuli existed for Pakistan to go into over-drive for
an accelerated missile development and acquisition programme. The decade of the 1990's
could better be termed as a ‘Pakistan missile acquisition decade’ rather than a
development one. There were more acquisitions than development.
Pakistan was impelled by the following stimuli, when contemporary
developments are analysed:
* Pakistan had achieved nuclear weapons capability by 1987, but
its only means of delivery were aircraft, basically the US-F16s.
* United States embargo on F-16 deliveries as a result of
Pressler Amendment rendered Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability vulnerable.
* Ballistic missiles had emerged as more potently destructive
weapons and cost-effective options by 1990-91. This was evident from the Iran-Iraq war of
the 1980s, the war in Afghanistan and the Gulf War.
* China, by, now had emerged as a source of ready supply of
ballistic missiles for the Islamic world.
* Pakistan’s strategic nexus with China enabled an easy and
assured access for build-up of Pakistan’s missile arsenal as it was for
Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation with Chinese help.
The stage was thus propitiously set for build -up of
Pakistan’s missile arsenal. Unlike its struggle to acquire wherewithal for nuclear
weapons production, Pakistan faced no problem in missile acquisition or production.
Pakistan’s Missile Development and Acquisition Philosophy
Strategically, Pakistan was aware that in terms of a missile
build-up, it was running against time. Pakistan had nuclear weapons, but with aircraft
delivery capability only. Aircraft had limitations both in terms of range of delivery of
nuclear weapons and so also penetration of India’s air-defence systems. Pakistan was
also sensitive to the indigenous development of India’s integrated missile
development programme. India’s programme was slow but potent and threatening for
Pakistan.
Pakistan’s missile build-up philosophy, therefore, differed
markedly from India’s. Analysis of events, indicate that Pakistan’s missile
build-up philosophy was grounded on the following guidelines:
* Speed was the uppermost imperative in terms of build-up of
Pakistan’s missile arsenal
* Direct off- the- shelf acquisition of missiles for Pak arsenal
was Priority I requirement .
* Indigenous Pakistani missile development programme was Priority
II. Or, at best , to proceed concurrently.
* The indigenous Pakistani missile development and production
programme should not waste time on indigenous R&D. It should follow a dual-track path:
Track I
Assembly of imported missiles in Pakistan from what at best could
be termed as SKDs (semi knocked down) kits and CKDs (completely knocked down) kits.
Track II
Indigenous fabrication of above missiles sub-systems and
propellants in a graduated manner. Track I would enable a quantitative jump in indigenous
Pakistan’s missile production expertise.
The above philosophy finds reflection in Pakistan’s missile
arsenal, both in terms of composition and capabilities.
Pakistan’s Missile Arsenal: Composition and Capabilities
Pakistan’s missile arsenal when discussed in the media or in
academic publications tends to get listed as one long list. Further, Pakistan’s
deception measures in relation to its missile arsenal tends to confuse analysts by giving
HATF serial numbers to subsequent developments. This is aimed at both for passing off
latest acquisitions as indigenous and confounding analysts.
For a more orderly analysis of Pakistan’s missile arsenal
and also in terms of range, propulsions systems and capabilities the Pakistani arsenal
needs to be viewed in the following groupings:
* HATF series
* GHAURI series
* SHAHEEN series
* M-11 (direct imports from China)
The following table lists capabilities and characteristics
PAKISTAN'S MISSILE ARSENAL: Composition,Capabilities
and Characteristics
| Missile |
Year
of Testing/
Acquisition |
Range
in km |
Warhead
Weight in Kg |
Propulsion
Stages Propellant |
Origin |
Deploy-
ment
Status |
HATF1 |
1989 |
80 |
500 |
Single
Solid |
Indigenous |
O |
| HATF 1A |
1992 |
100 |
500 |
Single
Solid |
Indigenous |
O |
| HATF II |
1989 |
300 |
500 |
Two
Solid |
PRC (M11) |
D |
| HATF III |
1997 |
600-800 |
500 |
Two
Solid |
PRC |
D |
| GHAURI I |
1998 |
1500 |
500-750 |
Single
Liquid |
DPRK/PRC |
T |
| GHAURI II |
1999 |
1500-2300 |
700 |
Two
Liquid |
DPRK/PRC |
T |
| SHAHEEN I |
1999 |
750 |
1000 |
Two
Solid |
PRC (M 9) |
T |
| SHAHEEN II |
2000 |
2500 |
1000 |
Two
Solid |
PRC |
T |
| M-11 |
1991-1998 |
300 |
500-800 |
Two
Solid |
PRC |
S |
Notes:
1. Deployment Status: D =Development O = Operational
S= Storage T- Tested
2. HATF II is said to be an indigenous version of China M-11 missile.
3. GHAURI series are reported to be direct acquisitions from DPRK, off-the-shelf,
but given Pakistani names. PRC facilitated this. Indigenous versions of GHAURI
when fabricated would hold Chinese command and control systems.
4. GHAURI II has inputs from China's CSS-2 and also from Saudi Arabia.
5. SHAHEEN I is reported to be the Pakistani version of M-9 (China)
The groupings of Pakistani missile arsenal analysed thus also finds reflection in terms of
distribution of development and fabrication within Pakistan, which is as follows:
| Missile Series |
Propellant |
Pakistan
Development/Fabrication |
Scientists |
| HATF |
Solid |
SUPARCO (Initially) |
Now likely NDC |
| GHAURI |
Liquid |
AQ Khan Research Lab Kahuta |
Dr. AQ Khan |
| SHAHEEN |
Solid |
PAEC National
Defence Complex (NDC) Fathehganj |
Prof. Samar Mubarak Mund |
In terms of analysis of missiles by ranges as per international
classification standards the Pakistani missiles can be categorised as under:
* SRBM- HATF series, SHAHEEN 1 and M-11
* MRBM- GHAURI series
* IRBM - SHAHEEN II
Note: In terms of US classification system both GHAURI and
SHAHEEN series are IRBMs
Thus Pakistan in a short span has been able to buildup its
missile targeting capabilities to IRBM ranges.
Pakistan’s Missile Targeting Strategy
Pakistani missile targeting strategies can be analysed from the
above groupings in terms of ranges and characteristics. From a deductive analysis, the
targeting strategy in terms of the different series appears to be as under. (See Map)
Note:
1. All ranges shown are maximum ranges claimed by Pakistan
2. Pakistan long range missiles cover all of India's metropolitan cities.
3. Pakistan's main strategic interest is likely to be Mumbai and Peninsular India in which
lie most of India's sensitive installations and infrastructure.
* HATF Series - HATF series formed the initial component
of the Pakistani missile arsenal. It was also planned as a counter to India’s Prithvi
missile. Besides the nuclear capability of HATF II and III, in the conventional mode it
was designed as an offensive weapon to knock off Indian armour concentrations. In the
defensive mode, it would be used in dual roles to destroy Indian bridge-heads in Pakistani
territory . Its chief use could be said to be along Pakistani borders with India, both
inside and outside.
* GHAURI series - With its extended range, the GHAURI
series could effectively reach virtually the whole of India but it seems that the
strategic targeting of this missile would be more towards Mumbai and Peninsular India in
which lie India’s most sensitive installations. GHAURI is a mobile system and could
be used for counter-value-strikes. Pakistan claims that GHAURI can carry nuclear, chemical
and anti-tank warheads.
* SHAHEEN series - SHAHEEN II unveiled on Pakistan Day
Parade this year (March 23,2000) is Pakistan’s answer to India’s Agni II. It has
as an all India coverage, but can be said to have Mumbai and Peninsular India as the main
target. With its ground mobility and solid state propellant systems it should logically
form the backbone of Pakistani nuclear deterrent. With mobility comes survivability and
therefore the SHAHEEN II could impart to Pakistan a second strike capability in the
future.
The above is a broad analysis of Pakistani’s missile
targeting strategy. Detailed analysis is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to
say, that other than large scale population centres of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in North
India heartland there are no lucrative or counter- value targets for Pakistan. In the past
analysts have carried out checks on the Indian Muslim population concentrations in North
India and came to the conclusion that because of high proportion of Indian Muslim
population in these urban centres, Pakistan would be unlikely to target them. However in a
recent interview on BBC, General Pervez Musharraf, the military ruler of Pakistan, when
questioned on this aspect, first hesitated to answer and when pressed by the British
interviewer stated to the effect that nothing is precluded, if Pakistan’s supreme
national interests are in jeopardy i.e. Indian Muslims are dispensable
Future Perspectives
In terms of future perspectives , the following can be said about
Pakistan’s missile build-up:
* Pakistan’s missile force would form the main delivery
system for its nuclear weapons.
* Pakistan’s emphasis on a "credible minimum
deterrent" would call for matching responses to India’s missile developments in
terms of ranges and payloads. This would imply that the GHAURI and SHAHEEN series would
receive priorities in terms of range and payload modifications.
* Pakistani SRBMs and MRBMs priorities would be more to build up
numbers to withstand both conventional and nuclear attrition.
* In terms of ICBM capability, Pakistan would definitely aspire
for it, but a host of factors are stacked against her. Even China, Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons and missiles benefactor would hesitate to impart ICBM capability to Pakistan, for
strategic reasons.
Despite the dismal state of Pakistan’s economy, her nuclear
weapons and missiles build-up programmes have never stood impeded. China for strategic
reasons and oil-rich Middle East countries for Islamic solidarity reasons have provided
the wherewithal and finances. Substantial amounts of drug money also stands ploughed into
these programmes by the Pakistani military.
In terms of future perspectives, it can be said that
Pakistan’s missile build-up would continue unabated.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s missile build-up all along has been
India-centric. Unlike India, which has to take the China threat into consideration,
Pakistan has the luxury to focus its entire missile build-up on Indian developments.
Strategically, Pakistan has today not only offset India’s
overwhelming conventional military superiority by its nuclear weaponisation but also
acquired a missile force which in terms of speed of acquisition outstrips India’s
pace of development of missiles. China prominently and DPRK by proxy have significantly
contributed to Pakistan’s missile build-up. China has even provided a complete plant
in 1995 to produce M-11 nuclear capable M-11 missiles and their variants in Pakistan.
China has persistently defied international non-proliferation norms and US pressures
against Chinese proliferation of WMD’s in Pakistan. No indicators are available to
suggest that China would desist in future too. China’s South Asian policy objective
to strategically de-stabilise India would continue unabated, despite protestations to the
contrary.
India has no political or military options to limit
Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation and missile build-up. Pakistan can only be limited
by India imposing an economically unaffordable counter-buildup in these fields-
uneconomical for Pakistan and her benefactors too. Needless to say that this is an
imperative if peace and stability have to prevail in South Asia.
26.9.2000
