The decision of US to deploy a National Missile Defence System (NMD) together with
a Theater Missile Defence System (TMD) in Western Pacific has brought a sharp reaction
from both Russia and China. For India , the question is whether the proposed deployment
has any impact on Indian security per se and if not, indirectly when China in retaliation
expands its nuclear arsenal and the delivery systems.
Although China still lacks the "strategic triad",
India’s nuclear weaponisation and delivery systems programme being at a very
preliminary stage will, for quite some time to come be no match to China and therefore any
enhancement and modernisation of Chinese arsenal cannot have any direct impact on India.
What India is looking for is credible nuclear deterrence and not nuclear parity. But if
China persists in deliberate proliferation and continues to transfer sophisticated nuclear
and missile technology to Pakistan, then, it will have a serious impact on India’s
security.
Official reaction of India so far, to the ambitious programme of
US on TMD and NMD has been correct and appropriate. Response if any, has been guarded and
non specific.
On the eve of his visit to India in the third week of July, the
Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, in a written response to the Hindu 1
said that "China has always taken a cautious and responsible attitude towards the
export of missiles and related items and exercised strict and effective control. " To
another question whether the export of missiles and related technology by China may be
providing a justification for TMD and NMD by USA, an irritated foreign minister said that
"it is nothing but an irresponsible gossip."
Actually the second issue should have been put differently
whether China irritated by the determination of USA to pursue TMD and NMD is retaliating
by continuing to provide missiles and related technology to Pakistan among other
countries. Though the foreign minister may not call it an irresponsible gossip, he would
at any rate have denied it stoutly. But the facts are other wise.
Chinese aid to Pakistan in the nuclear field violating all the
non proliferation norms is well known and documented. From transfer of weapon designs of
nuclear devices , delivery systems of M-11s, to a reprocessing plant for Plutonium as well
as the construction of the whole factory for the production of M11s, China has been and
continues to be consistently aiding Pakistan. China acquiesced in the transport of Nodong
Missiles (known by its reincarnation Ghauri) and provided transit facilities at Urumchi
for the PIA planes that made frequent trips from Pyongyang to Pakistan in late nineties.
What is disturbing is the New York Times report of July 2 this
year 2 that China has continued to aid Pakistan’s effort to build nuclear
capable long range missiles by stepped up shipment of speciality steels, guidance systems
and technical expertise to Pakistan. Intelligence agencies report that Chinese experts
were seen around the latest missile factory of Pakistan.
As the revelations were complicating President Clinton’s
agenda to grant permanent normal trade relationship to China now awaiting Senate approval,
a delegation headed by John Holum, Senior Adviser for Arms control was sent to Beijing. At
the end of two days talks in Beijing on July 7th and 8th, John Holum made hardly any
progress and the issue remains unresolved.3
President Clinton is facing two problems. One, the confirmation
by the National Intelligence Council that China had indeed transferred missiles to
Pakistan in 1992 in which case China would automatically face sanctions unless there is a
Presidential waiver. The second aspect is the continuing transfer of missile components
and technical know how to Pakistan in the last two years.
The Chinese, it appears are said to be adjusting their policy in
South Asia, meaning continuing to supply missile technology to Pakistan in retaliation to
what is perceived by China as shift in US policy towards India in the last two years
"in accepting India as a defacto nuclear power state." 4
Tang Jixuan to another question said "As a close neighbour
of both India and Pakistan, what China wants to see is peace and stability, not arms race
in South Asia." But does China expect to maintain peace and stability by continuing
to support nuclear and missile programmes in Pakistan?
What is worse, China continues to maintain that the Indian
nuclear tests or weaponisation does not affect the overall Chinese strategic posture. Zhao
Gancheng, Senior fellow of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, while
reiterating the three principles of Chinese Strategic Doctrine 5 makes an
astounding statement that "Few Chinese believe India would be a threat to China, even
after India’s nuclear tests. In one of our earlier papers (Paper 53.html) we have shown that Chinese Scholars and
Scientists were concerned with India’s nuclear developments even before Pokhran II,
testing of Prithvi and Agni.
No country however strong, can be unmindful of the strategic
developments taking place in its proximity. Alexander A.Pikayev 6 while
describing ABM Treaty revision as a challenge to Russian Security refers to the imbalance
that will be created with China when USA goes ahead with the NMD programme. He said
"Currently the predominance of Chinese conventional weapons vis-a-vis the vast
sparsely populated Russian Far East is balanced by Moscow’s superiority in nuclear
weapons. China’s nuclear build up (in response to TMD) might considerably erode this
superiority, further weakening Russia’s position in the Far East. This is coming from
Russia at a time when the relations between the two countries are excellent.
With the development of Agni II in India , China would forfeit
the formidable natural defences like the mountain chains and the inhospitable Tibetan
Plateau.7 To say that the Chinese are not concerned with the nuclear and
missile developments in India, a view echoed by some Indian China watchers too, may not be
correct.
There is enough literature on the National Missile Defence and
Theatre missile Defence plans of USA, their efficacy or other wise and we are not going
into detail on these issues. Suffice it to say that both the plans will have a direct
impact on the present ABM treaty, the Start II ratification and Start III negotiations.
Any setback to Start II and Start III will no doubt go against the very spirit of
disarmament envisaged under Article VI of the Norn Proliferation Treaty.
The question before India is- whether the NMD and TMD plans will
have any impact on Indian security or the Indian Nuclear Doctrine now being debated.
The argument that it does affect India runs thus. The NMD and the
TMD though not directed against India would bring in a natural response from China to
accelerate the modernisation and expansion of its nuclear arsenal. The small strategic
deterrent force of China with two dozens of ICBMs will be converted into a full nuclear
war fighting capability with significant increase in the number of ICBMs and MIRVing them.
The argument then goes further 8 that a modernised
Chinese force will have a cascading effect in South Asia. India’s response could be
renewed testing of nuclear weapons as well as delivery systems such as Agni II which in
turn would trigger a similar response from Pakistan including a renewed transfer of
missile technologies to Pakistan from China and North Korea.
In a cross border dialogue of SIAF forum on the impact on South
Asia of China’s strategic modernisation 9 as a consequence of TMD and NMD
Plans of USA, almost all the scholars from Pakistan opined that China out of its
legitimate concern may seek to enhance its strategic potential and as a chain reaction
India and in its wake Pakistan would end up towards a costly and vicious arms race. It
did not occur to them that China’s pique with USA would help Pakistan get more
transfers of sensitive materials!
A Chinese analyst quoting PLA Generals predicted the collapse of
the non proliferation regime if India is accepted in the nuclear weapon club and warned
that China would "retaliate by continuing the proliferation of nuclear technology and
devices that are restricted by the NPT either intentionally or because of loopholes in its
export- import system." 10
An Australian based Indian Analyst assessed that whenever
bilateral relations between China and US deteriorate, Beijing retaliates by doing what it
has always done in the past, namely by stepping up its transfers of nuclear and missile
technologies to countries hostile to India...." This is partially true but it does
not fully explain the consistent proliferation pattern of China in respect of Pakistan.11
The point that is missed is, that China’s transfer of
nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan is not in retaliation to what US does to itself
or Taiwan which could be incidental but more a deliberate proliferation exercise to
counter India’s growing strength in the nuclear and missile fields.
In the name of constructive engagement and trade USA has been
unable to make China accountable to the obligations under NPT. One respectable Indian
"Strategic Guru" has gone to the extent of saying that unable to prevent China
from proliferating, USA in order to safeguard its own security has gone ahead with the NMD
plan and could not care less how China’s proliferation activities affect the security
of other nations. 12
But has India ever taken up strongly either with China or USA on
the continuing proliferation of China that affects India’s security interests? Why
should India be defensive in taking up this matter? Did the Indian Foreign Minister take
it up with Tang Jiaxuan during the latter’s visit to India in forceful terms?
Imagine a hypothetical situation of India transferring Prithvi
technology to Vietnam. What would be the reaction of China? Same as India’s?
1. The Hindu dated 22nd July 2000, in written
answers to questions sent in by C.Raja Mohan.
2. Reported in Asian Age of July 3, 2000.
3. Quoted under "Region" in FEER, July 20, 2000, P.18
4. Ibid. P..20
5. The three principles are 1. Not to use nuclear weapon firstly. (2) not to use
nuclear weapons on non nuclear states. (3) not to support any country to develop nuclear
weapons.
6. A. Pikayev., "ABM Treaty Revisions: A Challenge to Russian Security, Issue
No. 4., Disarmament Diplomacy, March 2000, P.7. In this paper he says that Beijing has
adopted a US 10$ billion package for a new nuclear build up with two new types of
ballistic missiles, one against USA and another against Russia.
7. See an excellent analysis of "China’s Western Campaign" by
Kai-Alexander Schievogt in FEER of August 17, 2000.
8. See Frontline of August 4, 2000, "Implications for India".,by
R.Ramachandran, quoting Gaurav Kampani of the Centre of Non Proliferation Studies (CNS) of
the Monterey Institute of International Studies, US.
9. SIAF Forum- Dialogue XIV, "China’s strategic modernisation and
its impact on South Asia."
10. Quoted by Mohan Malik, Defence Studies Programme, Deakin University,
Victoria, Australia (June 16 of SIAF forum, Dialogue XIV)
11. Ibid, SIAF Forum
12. K.Subrahmanyam, "Death of a Treaty", Times of India in the
first week of July 2000.
