SRI LANKA ELECTIONS:
For Tamils it is a choice between Tweedledum and Tweedledee.
The Presidential election in Sri Lanka on December 21 appears
to be a close contest between the two main contestants Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil
Wickremesinghe of the opposition. Of the rest who are in the field, only the JVP candidate
may make some dent bettering their performance of 6.6% in the recent provincial elections.
In the last presidential elections, Chandrika got a decisive
majority with 62,28 percent of the total votes polled. Her election was nonetheless due to
the overwhelming support given by Tamils of all hues with the expectation that she will
find a solution to the ethnic strife.
Chandrika soon after becoming the fourth Executive President
after the last presidential elections on 9 November 1994 made an important policy
statement on 6 Jan. 1995. She declared that she would
1. Abolish the post of Executive President
2. Bring about a
sustainable peace in the ethnic issue.
She failed on both counts.
On the abolition of Presidency she made no serious move as she
realised soon after, the value of the unimpeded power that flows from a President and was
loath to change.
But it was on the ethnic issue that Chandrika made a brilliant
beginning only to be subsumed by the majoritarian bigotry which has dogged the ruling
political leadership since independence.
On 8 January 1995 Chandrika entered into an agreement with the
LTTE to end hostilities and four rounds of talks were held. It is learnt that about 35
letters were exchanged with the LTTE leadership. The talks broke down on 11 April 1995
over a clash between LTTE and Sri Lankan security forces at Trincomalee. The Sri Lankan
army went on an offensive with successive operations code-named Jayesikuru, Ranagossa
and finally Neerchendu. (Watershed)
Soon after assumption of power Chandrika announced a major
package peace of proposals that were radical in character, federal in all but the name and
in some ways better than the thirteenth amendment and even Annexure C of 1983. Having
announced the package she had no game plan or the will power to pursue the proposals.
History repeated itself and the "radical" portions were progressively diluted.
No attempts were made either to work out a consensus with the leading opposition party,
the UNP or the Buddhist clergy.
Another reason for the foot dragging on the proposals was the
success of the SL Army in the north. Jaffna Peninsula was cleared and a large area of
Vanni also came under the army control. The LTTE was driven to the Vanni jungles and a
portion of Mullathivu. Riding on a wave of ground victory Chandrika thought it fit not to
pursue the proposals. She was looking for a military solution
In our earlier updates we had repeatedly stressed that a military
solution was unobtainable in the north. She lost the good will of the Tamils also who had
voted for her in the expectation that she would get out of the clutches of the Buddhist
and extremist Sinhala fringe groups and make a bold move to end the ethnic crisis. But it
was not to be.
Under operation Ranagossa the Sri Lankan army tried to
open the main supply route through Vavuniya, Mankulam and Killinochi. When it failed, they
tried an alternate supply route through Mannar and Pooneryn. . Chandrika over estimated
the capacity of Sri Lankan army, who were already over stretched. On the advice given by
her Defence minister Gen. Ratwatte, the hero of Jaffna she desperately looked for a major
victory in the north on the eve of elections, which would have made her re-election easy.
But it was not to be.
When the army tried to move towards Mullaithivu the LTTE
stronghold in the last week of October 1999 after the announcement of election, disaster
struck.
It is realised by both the contestants that the Tamil votes are
crucial for success. Chandrika now contends that the existing Constitution does not allow
radical changes and she is therefore seeking a mandate to scrap the current Constitution
and end the long running war in the north. She had also hinted that in the event of being
elected she would adopt a new electoral system through a Constituent assembly.
Not to be outdone, the rival candidate Ranil Wickramesinghe
declared that if elected he would hand over the interim administration for two years to
the LTTE. When he realised that he would lose the Sinhala votes by this statement, he
clarified that an interim council will be formed in the northeast in which LTTE will also
be a constituent, as if the LTTE would agree to such an arrangement. Analysts from India
could recall the immense difficulties India faced in getting an LTTE led interim council
include other groups after the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.
From a UNP Press release of November 24, 1999, it is seen that
the proposal for an interim administrative body is the last step that would include the
LTTE among other groups.
The previous three steps were to be 1. Provide the people of
Vanni essential food and medicine. 2. Obtain the cooperation of the main opposition and
other opposition parties to identify a political solution acceptable to the majority. 3.
Bring back normalcy on the basis of results of the relevant talks.
If past experience is any indicator these proposals will get
bogged down in the second stage itself even before approaching the LTTE for talks.
In the disturbed condition in the north it is doubtful whether
Tamils would vote in large numbers. The non- LTTE groups also seen to be divided over the
issue unlike the last elections. The TULF and the official EPRLF have called for boycott
of the elections. Surprisingly Varadaraja Perumal has taken a different stand from the
party and appears to be inclined to support Chandrika. For the first time he made an open
statement on the ethnic issue and said that the two main political parties should reach
consensus before talking to the LTTE. He also emphasised the need for third force
intervention- either a foreign country or a local body. It is not clear what he meant by
"local body".
Chandrika may be able to get some votes through the efforts of
EPDP in Jaffna and PLOT in Vavuniya. Votes in Batticola and Amparai districts may get
evenly split between the two candidates.
Some analysts consider that Prabakaran’s strong attack on
Chandrika on Heroes day signalled LTTE’s preference to the UNP candidate. This is
doubtful.
Within the first week of November the LTTE under operation "Oyatha
Alaigal 3" (unceasing waves III) made spectacular gains in Vanni both in terms of
territory and war stores captured. It held a line in Vanni from Weli Oya (Manal aru) in
the east to Omanthai on the A9 and westwards through Iranai Iluppakkulam, Palampiddi,
Palla madhu, and up to the West Coast. One group of LTTE cadres made probing attacks on
the well entrenched army camps of Weli Oya overrunning Thanikkallu and Ceylon theatre
camps of Sri Lankan army but failed to go beyond due to stiff resistance from the Sri
Lankan forces.
Manal Aru which was renamed Weli Oya in Sinhala is important both
politically and strategically. Successive governments in Sri Lanka (mostly UNP) settled
Sinhalas under a scheme to provide land for the landless in Tamil areas. The Tamils claim
that the State sponsored settlements were meant to drive a wedge physically and
geographically the Tamil areas of north and east. The statement of Brig. Hiran Halangoda
(Sunday Times, Feb. 1998) "Weli Oya is very important militarily. Our presence will
not allow the NorthEast merger. Terrorists cannot win Eelam as long as we stay here. If we
go, there will be a threat to Padaviya, Kebitigullewa and eventually Anuradhapura"
should be seen in this context. It is no surprise that one whole division has been
deployed to defend this area and therefore any major success of LTTE in this area would
have had an adverse impact in the current elections.
With two divisions of the Sri Lankan army on the run in Vanni,
one would have expected LTTE to go further towards Vavuniya town. The announcement of LTTE
asking civilians to vacate Vavuniya town was taken seriously and there was an exodus from
the town. Except for some mortar attacks on Omanthai post there was no move to go further
south.
Instead LTTE appears to have gone for the jugular, the Jaffna
peninsula and the Elephant pass camp, which guards its approach. The army base here is
well defended in depth with a string of outlying posts connected to each other.
After consolidating for a month, the LTTE resumed its offensive
in the north. Unlike an earlier frontal attack on Elephant Pass camp where LTTE lost over
500 cadres in a single operation, it has now changed its strategy to go for incremental
advance. Two small naval stations at Vettilakerni and Koddaikadu on the east coast were
overrun by cadres coming in boats and simultaneously, army defence posts at Chavakachery,
Navatkuzhi, Kodikamam and Iyyakachi in the Then Marawachi region have come in for attacks.
Latest reports indicate that a portion of army’s defences at Paranthan that connects
Elephant pass has also been overrun.
The immediate objective of LTTE appears to be to recapture the
security positions that it held prior to operation Jayesikuru in May 1997.
For the Tamils in general the election appears to be a non event.
Much is made about Prabakaran’s speech on Heroes day this year and many analysts see
prospects for peace after the elections. The key sentences were not the call for third
party mediation but the ones, that said
* that they had reached " turning point in this long
historical journey towards emancipation".
* "Years ago, our people made a decision that an independent
state of Tamil Eeelam is the only and the final solution to our national conflict."
* "This anti-Tamil racial politics offers no alternative to
the Tamils other than to fight and establish an independent Tamil State."
In an earlier speech on the hero’s day of 1995, Prabakaran
on the capture of Jaffna by Sri Lankan forces had said "They may hoist the flag and
light fire crackers but we want to express one thing….As long as the Sri Lankan armed
forces occupy Jaffna the door to peace talks will always remain tightly shut".
With the LTTE in possession of vast tracts of territory, any
future talks with the incumbent President would only be on the condition of demilitarising
Jaffna Peninsula.
Will any incumbent President be allowed to agree?
Reports have just been received about an attempted attack on
Chandrika’s life. Luckily she escaped. Though details are not yet available, it only
shows that politics in Sri Lanka has reached dangerous dimensions and what is required now
urgently is statesmanship and not leadership alone.
Dr. S.Chandrasekharan
19.12.99
