The Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr.Nawaz Sharif, finds himself
caught in a whirlpool.
His serious difficulties cannot be attributed only to his
mishandling of the Kargil adventure. There are other reasons too-- his introvert
personality, his devious style of governance, his lack of loyalty to individuals and
parties who contributed to his spectacular electoral success in 1997, his tendency to
operate through a small coterie without important decisions being preceded by wide-ranging
discussions in his party and the Cabinet, wrong decisions in the selection of important
functionaries such as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) and his wrong judgement in
entrusting sensitive responsibilities to them without foreseeing the likely implications
and so on.
He has fallen out with important personalities in his Pakistan
Muslim League (PML) like Mr. Gohar Ayub, Minister for Water and Power, Mr.Ejaz-ul-Haq, son
of the late Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, and Mr.Mohammad Azhar, member of the National Assembly and
former Governor of Punjab, all of whom had stood steadfastly by Mr.Sharif during his days
in the opposition.
Mr.Gohar Ayub has been angry and sulking because of Mr.Sharif's
action in asking the army, without consulting him, to take over the responsibility for
running the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). Gen. Pervez Musharraf, to the
discomfiture of Mr.Sharif, has taken over in his hands the responsibility for
re-negotiating the power tariffs with the foreign independent power producers, thereby
reducing Mr.Sharif as well as Mr. Ayub to a zero so far as power is concerned.
Mr.Ejaz-ul-Haq and Mr.Mohammad Azhar were unhappy over their
perceived marginalisation in the party and have been giving vent to their feelings.
Mr.Sharif has moved against Mr.Azhar by removing him from the post of Senior
Vice-President of the PML, but has avoided any action against Mr.Ejaz-ul-Haq.
Mr.Sharif rarely holds Cabinet meetings or attends the National
Assembly sessions and most important decisions are taken by a small coterie consisting of
Mr.Sharif, his father, Mr.Mohammad Sharif, his brother, Mr.Shabaz Sharif, who is the Chief
Minister of Punjab, Mr. Saifur Rehman, who is in charge of the Accountability Cell which
is widely perceived as the Benazir Witchhunt Cell, and Mr.Mushahid Hussain, Minister for
Information and Broadcasting.
All important decisions such as the removal of the powers of the
President to dismiss the Prime Minister and appoint the Chiefs of the Armed Forces, the
stringent anti-defection legislation which has prevented any revolt in the PML, the
selection of Mr.Mohammad Rafiq Tarar, a close personal friend of Mr.Sharif's father and an
active member of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), as the
President of the country overlooking the claims of party stalwarts, the introduction of
the Shariat Bill which got stalled in the Senate, the selection of Gen. Musharraf as the
COAS and the unwise entrusting of some civilian responsibilities to him and the launching
of the Kargil invasion were taken by this coterie. The Cabinet and the PML were informed
only subsequently.
Mr. Sharif has fallen out with the Awami National Party (ANP) in
the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM, formerly
known as the Mohajir Qaumi Movement) in Sindh, both of which stood by him during his days
in the opposition and contributed to his electoral success in 1997 in their provinces.
His decision in October last year to appoint Gen. Musharraf as
the COAS, was taken on the recommendation of his father, President Tarar and Lt.Gen.
(Retd) Javed Nassir, former Director-General of the ISI, without consulting Gen. Jehangir
Karamat, the outgoing Chief.
The decision was also influenced by Mr.Sharif's dislike of
Lt.Gen.Ali Quli Khan Khattak, a relative of Mr.Gohar Ayub, who, as the Director-General of
Military Intelligence in 1995, had alerted Gen. Abdul Wahid Kakkar, the then COAS, and
Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, then Prime Minister, to the plot by a group of army officers close to
the TJ and the HUM to seize power after assassinating Mrs. Bhutto and senior army
officers.
Both Mr.Sharif and his father are close to the TJ and participate
regularly in its spiritual gatherings. After taking over as the Prime Minister, Mr.Sharif
has been periodically inviting TJ leaders to give religious discourses at Cabinet
meetings.
Mr. Sharif must be ruing his decision to appoint Gen. Musharraf
as the COAS. This Mohajir General, known for his alleged proximity to the drug barons,
Osama bin Laden, the HUM and the Taliban, has been as over-assertive as Gen. Mirza Aslam
Beg, the previous Mohajir COAS, was during the first tenure of Mrs. Bhutto as the Prime
Minister.
He has been running the WAPDA without consulting Mr. Sharif and
Mr.Ayub and overstepped the limits in implementing the plans for the invasion of Kargil by
sending in regular Pakistani army soldiers to take over the ridges after the
"Mujahideen" groups (essentially the pro-Osama Al Badr) had initially occupied
them. According to some Pakistani analysts, while Mr.Sharif had cleared the use of the
"Mujahideen" from the Afghan camps for this operation, the General used regular
army troops without informing Mr.Sharif beforehand.
Gen. Musharraf has been having his way in one issue after
another. He forced Mr. Sharif to appoint him concurrently as the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee for a period of three years, thereby breaking with the past
tradition of rotating this post among the Chiefs of the three wings of the armed forces.
He justified this demand on the ground that the Army was the most
important component of the Armed Forces and that it would/should have the exclusive
responsibility for nuclear command and control. The primacy in nuclear decision-making,
which Mr. Sharif had managed to wrest from the Army when the soft-spoken, under-assertive
Gen. Jehangir Karamat was the Chief, has now been practically re-assumed by Gen.
Musharraf.
Unhappy over the break with this tradition, Admiral Fasih
Bokhari, whose turn it was to become the Chairman, has resigned as the Chief of the Naval
staff.
After the Kargil fiasco, Gen. Musharraf has been telling the Army
rank and file and the officer corps, during his inspection tours, that Kargil was the most
brilliant triumph the Pakistani Army had scored since Independence and that it could have
been as significant as the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East in forcing India to negotiate
seriously on Kashmir, if only the political leadership had known how to take advantage of
the "military triumph".
He loses no opportunity to challenge political comments on the
wisdom of the Kargil operation and to express his opposition to Mr.Sharif's succumbing to
US pressure on the questions of the Taliban and Osama. Mr. Sharif is clearly on the
defensive vis-à-vis Gen. Musharraf and does not know how to rein him in, if not ease him
out.
Mr.Sharif's dilemma has been compounded by the economic
difficulties due to the increase in fiscal expenditure (the estimated cost of the Kargil
operation: $ 380 million), the delay in the next instalment ($ 280 million) of payment by
the IMF and the revolt of the trading community, an important bastion of support for the
PML, over his succumbing to the IMF pressure to impose the General Sales Tax on retailers
too, after having vigorously opposed this IMF demand when he was in the opposition.
His implementation of other IMF conditionalities relating to
abolition of subsidies and increase in utility rates has antagonised the middle and lower
middle classes.
Thus, Mr.Sharif finds himself in the same position in which
former President Suharto of Indonesia found himself before his forced exit in
1998---damned if he implemented the IMF conditionalities and damned, if he did not.
The Joint Opposition Alliance and the Islamic parties have been
trying to take advantage of the growing anti-Sharif feelings to mount a sustained street
campaign for the exit of Mr.Sharif, similar to the campaigns which preceded the exit of
Field Marshal Ayub Khan in the late 1960s and the overthrow of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto by
Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. But, fortunately for Mr.Sharif, the campaign has not so far been
picking up momentum due to two reasons.
First, many opposition leaders do not like Gen. Musharraf and do
not want to provide him with a pretext for intervening. Second, the Islamic parties are
not prepared to support the non-religious parties unless they are assured that there would
be no return of Mrs. Bhutto to power and that the Islamic parties would have a decisive
role in any interim Government, if the opposition succeeds in forcing the exit of
Mr.Sharif.
Apart from the confusion and hesitation in the opposition ranks,
the other beacon of hope for Mr. Sharif has been from Washington D.C. The USA, which
dislikes and distrusts Gen. Musharraf because of the past suspicions of his proximity to
the narcotics barons, Osama, the HUM and the Taliban, wants Mr.Sharif to continue in power
and to prevent any coup by Gen. Musharraf.
The USA has been using Gen. Karamat to ensure that the serving
Punjabi Generals would not co-operate with any anti-Sharif coup plans of the Mohajir COAS.
After Kargil, Gen. Karamat had been to the US, reportedly for discussions on this subject
with the officials of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
It is understood that subsequently a team of senior CIA officials
had flown to Colombo in the last week of September for further discussions with Gen.
Karamat, who was among those invited to a seminar on the nuclear issue, organised by the
Regional Centre For Strategic Studies. The discussions with Gen. Karamat were reportedly
held in the margins of the seminar.
According to Sri Lankan sources, who closely monitor the
activities of the Regional Centre, interestingly, a keen observer, note-taker and
talent-spotter at the seminar was reportedly Miss Joan Rohlfing, a US non-proliferation
expert who had previously served in the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Pentagon
and possibly also in the Non-Proliferation Division of the CIA, and who has recently
joined the US Embassy in New Delhi as a Special Assistant to the US Ambassador, a
temporary post of the US Energy Department created initially for six months.
There are, however, no indications as to whether she joined in
the discussions with Gen. Karamat in the margins of the seminar as to how to rein in Gen.
Musharraf.
The moves in the Congress to give the US President, Mr.Bill
Clinton, powers to waive sanctions under the Pressler Amendment to enable a resumption of
the arms supply relationship with Pakistan discontinued in 1990 are meant to strengthen
the hands of Mr.Sharif in his tussle with Gen. Musharraf.
The US calculates that in return for its "Rescue Nawaz"
exercise, Mr. Sharif would respond to US pressures on the Osama and Taliban issues and the
signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. If Mr. Sharif does so, it is doubtful
whether his position would be strengthened because of the widespread support in Pakistan
for Osama and the Taliban.
Thus, Mr.Sharif finds himself in the unenviable position of
wanting to accommodate the US wishes, but not yet able to do so.
India should wait and watch the evolving situation instead of
letting itself be pressurised by the US to resume the Lahore process immediately with
Pakistan. It should avoid doing anything which could be interpreted as helping out the US
in its attempts to rescue Mr.Sharif.
B.RAMAN
(10-10-99)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai. E-Mail address: corde@vsnl.com)
