A striking feature of the Pakistani media post-mortem into the
Kargil conflict is that a large number of analysts, including retired bureaucrats and
military officers and independent columnists, seem to have convinced themselves that
Pakistani army regulars were not involved in the occupation of the Indian territory and
that it was largely the Pakistan-based "mujahideen" groups, with the pro-Osama
bin Laden Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Al Badr in the forefront,
which had invaded Indian territory and occupied many ridges left unguarded by the Indian
army.
In their view, while the Pakistani Army might have drawn up the
plans for the "mujahideen" groups and given them logistic support, it was not
directly involved. Barring some exceptions such as Capt. (Retd) Ayaz Amir of the
":Dawn", Syed Talat Hussain of the "Nation" and Mr.Kamran Khan of the
"News", who seem to be skeptic about the official version that it was largely
the initiative of the "mujahideen" in which the army had no role to play, the
rest of the analysts have projected the conflict as a brilliant victory by the
"mujahideen", which was frittered away by the ham-handedness of the Pakistani
political leadership and diplomacy.
They give full credit to India for turning what they describe as
the "humiliating initial defeat" of the Indian army into a political and
diplomatic triumph for India by rallying the support of not only the US and other Western
countries, but also China for its contention that there had been a violation of the Line
of Control (LoC), which had to be reversed by Pakistan.
However, the small group of independent analysts, who do not go
along with this analysis, has highlighted many inconsistencies in the Pakistani official
version of the conflict . According to Syed Talat Hussain, while the Pakistani Foreign
Office was throughout consistent in its claim that it was the "mujahideen", who
had occupied the ridges, and that there was no Pakistani army involvement, the army's
version was more nuanced.
Initially, in May, when things seemed to be going along well for
Pakistan and the Indian army had not yet recovered from the shock of finding the ridges
occupied by infiltrators from the Northern Areas of Pakistan (Gilgit and Baltistan),
senior Pakistani army officers were freely admitting that while the encampments on the top
of the ridges were manned by the Pakistani army regulars, the "mujahideen" had
taken up position along the slopes and were carrying out hit and run raids on Indian
soldiers trying to dislodge the Pakistani army encampments. They changed this version only
in June, when the US administration took up repeatedly with Pakistan the involvement of
its army in the Kargil adventure.
Thus, in their briefings for foreign Military Attaches and
journalists in the Army headquarters, senior Pakistani officers were projecting that the
fighting was going on at two levels--conventional fighting between the two regular armies
for the control of strategic heights, some of which, they admitted, had been
"newly-acquired" by the Pakistani army, and "guerilla warfare, hit and run
and cloak and dagger operations" between the "mujahideen" and the Indian
army in which the Pakistani army was not involved.
According to Syed Talat Hussain, the Pakistani army, while
admitting that it was fighting with the Indian army for the control of the ridges, claimed
at the same time that the ridges, though newly-acquired, were located on the LoC and not
inside Indian territory.
The other interesting question figuring in the analyses of
independent commentators is when was the plan for the occupation of the ridges drawn up
and what were the respective roles of the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr.Nawaz Sharif, and
Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS).
The following re-construction emerges from a scrutiny of these
analyses: A two-pronged plan to reduce the Indian army pressure on the extremists and
foreign mercenaries in the Kashmir Valley and Jammu was drawn up immediately after
Mr.Sharif returned to power in February,1997. The plan provided for activating the LoC in
the Drass-Kargil-Batalik sector and for the occupation of the ridges and for stepping up
the assistance of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the remnants of the Sikh
terrorist groups in Punjab.
The implementation of the plan in the Kargil sector was started
in September,1998, when Gen.Jehangir Karamat was the COAS. Snow-mobiles procured from
abroad were used to transport Pakistani army engineers to the ridges for the construction
of bunkers. After this was completed, Pakistani army regulars moved into these bunkers and
took up position on the ridges.
According to these accounts, Gen.Musharraf was not the initiator
of the plans for the foray into the Kargil sector. He merely vigorously implemented the
plans drawn up under his predecessor and brought in the pro-bin Laden terrorist groups to
assist the army and to defend the approaches to the army encampments on the top of the
ridges.
Commenting on the second component of the plan for assisting the
remnants of the Sikh terrorists, Mr.Jassim Taqui of the "Nation", who strongly
believes that Mr. Sharif and Gen. Musharraf have been working in tandem, writes as follows
(July 4) of the Sikh component of the plan:" Nawaz Sharif showed the Indians that he
was keeping his option open in matters pertaining to the Khalistan movement. The presence
of Ganga Singh Dhillon , a Khalistani proponent based in the USA, at a function organised
by the Government in Lahore , where Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was the chief guest, took
everyone by surprise. "
He adds:" Also, the Pakistan Government appointed
Lt.Gen.(retd) Javed Nasir, former Director-General of the ISI, as the chief of the
Pakistani Gurudwara Prabandak Committee. Mr.Dhillon's presence at the reception was not
without significance. It showed that the Khalistanis were not all that out of favour with
the Pakistani establishment. The appointment of Lt.Gen. Javed Nasir is significant.
Gen.Nasir, who was the ISI chief during the Bombay blasts of
March,1993, is a known (anti-India) hawk. In fact, he was reportedly so out of favour with
the Americans that he had to be removed during Nawaz's previous tenure to appease
Washington."
In this connection, some Pakistani analysts have drawn attention
to the increase in the number of Sikh pilgrims and foreign-based Sikh extremists visiting
Lahore since Lt.Gen. Nasir was appointed by Mr.Sharif as his intelligence adviser last
year. The International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) was allowed to hold a
meeting-cum-photo exhibition in Lahore on June 6 to mark the 15th anniversary
of Operation Blue Star under which the Indian army had raided the Golden Temple. Among
those allowed by the Pakistan Government to attend the function was Satnam Singh of the
ISYF, Germany.
Mr.Sharif had also appointed Brig. (Retd) Imtiaz as his Internal
Security Advisor last year. Brig. Imtiaz, who was the head of the ISI's political division
during the Zia-ul-Haq regime, was responsible for assisting the Sikh extremists. On coming
to power in 1988, Mrs.Benazir Bhutto sacked him and ordered the ISI to stop its assistance
to the Sikhs.
Mr.Sharif, who was then Chief Minister of Punjab, recruited Brig.
Imtiaz into the Punjab police and made him responsible for assisting the Sikh terrorists.
On coming to power in 1990 as the Prime Minister, Mr.Sharif appointed Brig. Imtiaz as the
Director of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and transferred to the IB the responsibility for
assisting Sikh terrorists. On her return to power in 1993, Mrs.Bhutto again sacked
Brig.Imtiaz and ordered the IB to stop helping the Sikh terrorists.
Speaking in the National Assembly in 1995, Mr.Sharif accused
Mrs.Bhutto of damaging the Kashmiri cause by helping India deal with the Khalistani
movement. He contended that this had freed many Indian army units from duties in the
Punjab and that these had been re-deployed in Kashmir. Mr.Sharif's reported interest in
stepping up assistance to the Sikh terrorists should be a matter of concern to India.
It would appear that concerns caused in the US, China and Saudi
Arabia over the use of the pro-bin Laden groups by the Pakistani army played an important
role in the pressure exercised by these countries on Pakistan to restore the status quo
ante. The US was concerned over the implications for the security of American interests
and nationals. The Chinese were worried over Pakistan shifting these groups to the
Northern Areas, which have a common border with China's Muslim majority Xinjiang province.
And Saudi Arabia was disturbed because all these groups are against the Saudi ruling
family.
It also emerges that in April, the Clinton Administration had
sent senior military and State Department officials to Islamabad to express its annoyance
over the contacts of the ISI and the Pakistan Army with bin Laden and the terrorist groups
supporting him. In this connection, Gen. Anthony Zinni, Commanding Officer of the US
Central Command, visited Pakistan on April 20 and 21 and a group of counter-terrorism
experts headed by Mr.Gibson Lampher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia,
in the first week of April. Mr.Michael Sheehan, the State Department's counter-terrorism
Co-ordinator, was also in the group. Gen.Zinni and Mr.Lampher had again come jointly to
Islamabad in June during the Kargil conflict to convey a strong message from President
Clinton to Mr.Sharif and Gen.Musharraf.
Interestingly, when Mr.Sharif, after his return from Washington
in the beginning of July, met what was described as a delegation of the
"mujahideen" ostensibly to appeal to them to withdraw from the Kargil area, he
called only seven members of the Hizbul Mujahideen, an indigenous Kashmiri organisation
not associated with bin Laden's anti-US activities. He did not call any of the pro-bin
Laden groups, apparently due to an apprehension that his meeting them would confirm
suspicions of their involvement in Kargil in collaboration with the army.
Thereafter, he flew to Saudi Arabia on July 17 with a
high-powered delegation, including the COAS, to allay Saudi fears over the nexus of the
Pakistani army with the anti-Saudi ruling family extremist groups of bin Laden.
The atmosphere in Pakistan is sullen. There is a widespread
impression that Mr.Sharif has damaged the Kashmiri cause by mishandling the Kargil foray
and thereby demoralising the Kashmiri militant groups. He will be under pressure to show
some results-- if not on the ground, at least in the diplomatic field. He cannot do so
unless he takes strong action against bin Laden and his groups as demanded by the US. Such
action, while beneficial internationally, could be counter-productive domestically. His
position is thus unenviable.
To neutralise the criticism of his detractors, he and the army
may feel constrained to show to the people that withdrawal from Kargil would not mean
restoration of normalcy in that area. Pakistani provocations in Kargil could thus
continue, but from safe sanctuaries in the Northern Areas and not from encampments in
Indian territory.
B.RAMAN
(2-8-99)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai.
E-mail: corde@vsnl.com )
