There have been four massacres of innocent
civilians, most of them reportedly Hindus, in the Jammu Division of Jammu & Kashmir (J
& K) since June 30. In addition, there were also an attack on officials of the Border
Security Force (BSF) and explosions and other incidents of violence in the Kashmir Valley.
These incidents, orchestrated by the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) of Pakistan, have had the objective of announcing to the world that, contrary to the
claims of the Government of India, the insurgency in the State is far from over and that
the end of the conflict in the Kargil sector would not mean regional peace unless
international opinion takes a more active interest in the Kashmir question.
An added aim, after Pakistan's capitulation to US pressure for
the withdrawal of its forces from the Kargil sector, is to restore the morale of the
militant groups in the State, which felt let down by the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr.Nawaz
Sharif's agreeing to the US demand.
In the proxy war launched by the ISI in the State in 1989, the
operating principle was "hit and run", the aim being to create demoralisation in
the Indian security forces and the civilian population by inflicting large casualties on
them. "Liberation" and occupation of territory was not the immediate objective.
The ISI had calculated that if it kept the Indian security forces bleeding, political and
public opinion in India would ultimately realise the futility of holding on to the State.
The proxy invasion plan of Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff
(COAS), Gen. Pervez Musharraf, changed the operating principle to one of "occupy and
hit", the aim being to set up a bridgehead by occupying the ridges in the Kargil
sector left unguarded by the Indian army during winter and thereafter spread the area
under occupation each winter by taking advantage of its logistic difficulties. The role of
the Pakistan army became primary in this operation and that of the ISI and the
militant-cum-terrorist groups secondary.
The proxy invasion plan having failed partly due to the vigorous
operations of the Indian army and Air Force and partly due to international pressure on
Pakistan, Islamabad has now reverted back to the earlier operating principle of "hit
and run", with the primary role once again being assumed by the ISI and its
surrogates in the State.
The ISI's proxy war has passed through two stages. During the
first stage (1989-92), the ISI played a direct role in providing financial, training and
arms assistance to militant groups in the State. No intermediaries were used and
assistance was given to any group, which was prepared to indulge in violence.
A large number of Kashmiri militant groups received ISI
assistance during this period--some led by the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) of the
Jamaat-e-Islami which advocated merger of the State with Pakistan and others by the Jammu
& Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which wanted independence. Within a few months of
the start of the proxy war, the pro-independence groups set up their ascendancy over the
pro-Pakistan groups.
Till 1992, the US and other Western countries looked upon the
extremists as "freedom-fighters" and not terrorists and showed no interest in
the demand for independence. However, the situation changed after the extremists' attack
on a group of Israeli tourists in 1992.
For the first time, there was concern in the West over the
terrorist methods of these groups and over the role of the ISI in assisting them. There
was also increasing interest in non-governmental circles in the US close to the Clinton
Administration in the aims and objectives of the pro-independence groups. The feasibility
of independence as a solution became the subject of study by many of these
non-governmental groups.
Concerned over these developments, the ISI introduced two changes
in 1993. First, it started using intermediaries for keeping the militancy alive instead of
directly doing so. Second, it cut off assistance to all pro-independence groups and made
future assistance dependent on the recipient group supporting merger with Pakistan.
The first organisation chosen as the intermediary was the
Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed. Funds and arms and ammunition
were given to it and it was asked to take over the responsibility for running training
camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Afghanistan with the help of Afghan veterans
and for distributing money and weapons to different pro-Pakistan groups. Most of the
assistance went to the HM.
In 1993, the Taliban had not yet appeared on the scene in
Afghanistan and the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar was still the most important and
favored Pakhtoon Mujahideen group in Afghanistan. The recruits of the HM were trained in
camps in Afghan territory by instructors of Hizb-e-Islami and the Afghan mercenaries who
came into Kashmir with the HM were followers of Heckmatyar.
Subsequently, the ISI started using the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad and
its militant wing called the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) too as
intermediaries for funneling assistance to the extremists in the State. These
organisations, of Wahabi orientation, are closer to the Jamiat-ul-Islam of Pakistan headed
by Maulana Fazlur Rahman and to the Taliban.
The ISI saw in the anger in the Indian Muslim community caused by
the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December,1992, an opportunity to drive a wedge
between the Hindus and Muslims in the rest of India, thereby adding to the difficulties of
the Government of India. It also wanted the extremist groups supported by it in Kashmir to
attack the Hindus of the Jammu Division in order to drive them out.
Thus, from 1993, the ISI's assistance to the extremist groups in
the State was made conditional on their supporting merger with Pakistan, agreeing to
attack the Hindus in the Jammu Division and assisting the alienated sections of the Muslim
youth in the rest of India in developing a militant capability by training them in their
camps in Kashmiri territory.
The Jammat-e-Islami and the HM were reluctant to accept these
conditions as they did not want to extend their operational aims beyond Kashmir, but the
Lashkar, the HuA and the Al Badr, which subsequently came into the picture, readily
accepted them. They thus became the privileged groups of the ISI from 1994 onwards and
have now been orchestrating most of the violence in the State.
Though the HM, the Lashkar, the HuA and the Al Badr still claim
to be working together, important differences divide them:
***The HM is essentially an organisation of indigenous Kashmiris,
but the other three consist largely of Pakistanis, Afghans and Arab mercenaries.
***The HM describes its aim as the liberation of Kashmir from the
control of the Government of India and its merger with Pakistan. The other three describe
their aim as the liberation of Kashmir from the control of the Hindus and its merger with
Pakistan, to be followed by a similar "liberation" of the Muslims in the rest of
India. These three organisations view Kashmir as the "gateway to India" and call
for the creation of two more Muslim homelands--one for the Muslims of North India and the
other for those of South India.
***In pursuance of their aims, the Lashkar and the HuA have been
spreading their presence to the rest of India and networking with Islamic extremist groups
in other States.
***The HM is close to Heckmatyar whereas the other three are
supporters of the Taliban. Angered by the proximity of the HM to Heckmatyar, the Taliban
has closed down its training camps in Afghanistan and expelled its office-bearers from
there.
***The Lashkar, the HuA and the Al Badr are strongly against the
US, Israel and the ruling family of Saudi Arabia and are members of Osama bin Laden's
International Islamic Front for Jihad against the US and Israel, but the HM keeps away
from the anti-US and anti-Saudi ruling family activities of bin
Laden.
In its eagerness to achieve its objectives against India,
Pakistan, through the ISI, has thus been following contradictory policies. It seeks US
support for the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue, but has been arming groups,
which vow to attack American targets, in order to use them against India. It describes
Saudi Arabia as its closest Islamic ally, but has been sheltering groups which are
carrying on a campaign against the Saudi ruling family and the presence of US troops in
Saudi Arabia.
The increasing concern in the US intelligence community over the
use of these anti-US and anti-Israel groups by Pakistan in its attempts to destabilise
India is an important reason for the sympathetic attitude of the US towards India during
the conflict in the Kargil sector.
The US declared the HuA as an international terrorist
organisation in October,1997, after which it has re-named itself as the
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and there have been reports that the US is collecting evidence
against the Lashkar in order to make a similar declaration against it.
Despite this, the ISI, with the approval of the Sharif
Government, continues to use these organisations to massacre Hindus in the Jammu Division
and to organise acts of violence in the Valley too. An intensification of such terrorist
violence not only in Jammu & Kashmir, but also in other parts of India is to be
expected in the wake of the set-back suffered by the Pakistan army in the Kargil area.
Another danger is the possibility of attacks on American targets in India by these
organisations to give vent to their anger against the US and to create embarrassment to
the Government of India in its relations with the US.
B.RAMAN
(21-7-99)
