Two papers were published recently on Sino Indian Relations in
our web site-one a chronology after Pokhran II tests and another on the Indian nukes and
China. This paper is more in the nature of a commentary to supplement the other two.
In the paper on Indian Nukes and China, Mr.Gopal had referred to
the observations made by Prof. Tan Chung, Co- Chairman of the Institute of
Chinese studies, that the Chinese do not feel particularly insecure about India going
nuclear. The remarks made by the Chinese Ambassador in India were also to the effect
that "Beijing does not see India as a threat to its security."
Soon after Pokhran II tests, Mr. C.V.Ranganathan, Chairman of the
same Institute of Chinese studies visited China to make an assessment of the Chinese
position after the tests. On his return he made two observations on the Chinese
perception.(1)
1. China has not violated any treaty or laws in the
transfer of nuclear know how to Pakistan. On the question of missiles the Chinese
were however defensive.
2. China is not really concerned about India going
nuclear but was upset that India named China to justify its tests.
While it is true that the Indian nuclear programme was less of a
concern to China than those of the United States and Russia (2), could it be said
that the development of a nuclear capability of India is of no concern at all to
China?
Chinese Reaction in the Past:
We do not have access to the vast amount of material that is
being produced in China by institutions dealing with international relations particularly
on the relationship between Indian and China. But what little is known shows a
different picture from what is officially made out.
One Chinese scholar had argued that the motive for the Indian
nuclear programme was that "India is trying to gain the initiative in the Asia
Pacific."(3)
Chinese scientists affiliated with the nuclear weapons programmes
showed concern over India's nuclear capability and were quoted to have pointed out that
"India's nuclear infra structure is large enough to possibly outproduce China in the
future if so desired"(4).
This was way back towards the end of eighties and the beginning
of nineties, before Pokhran II, before the Prithvi was fully tested and when the Agni was
in the "technology demonstration" stage.
Chinese Reaction after Pokhran II tests:
Of the five recognised nuclear weapon powers, China has been the
most vehement in condemning the Indian tests. While other nuclear weapon powers and
their surrogates have generally called upon India to sign the CTBT and place a moratorium
on production of fissile material, China was one country which called upon India to sign
the NPT. Some Indian scholars tried to explain that the vehemence of China's
reaction was due to the letter the Prime minster of India wrote to Clinton naming China in
justifying the tests. As if to strengthen this reasoning they point out that
the initial reaction of Chinese before the contents of the letter to Clinton were known,
was balanced.
All that had happened was that what should have been left
"unsaid" in diplomatic exchanges was said but the fact of the matter was that
if the Indian security concerns were to be considered in a larger matrix, the Chinese
threat will have to be taken into account.
After the tests, it is learnt that the Chinese were in constant
touch with USA and they were also being regularly briefed on the progress of the Jaswant
Singh-Talbott talks. India's nuclear tests figured in the talks between Clinton and
Jiang Zemin during the former's visit to China and in the joint communique issued toward
the end of the visit. China is understood to have accused USA of being soft on India
and even went to the extent of holding USA responsible for making India go nuclear!
China's track record:
Has China followed the provisions of NPT when it wants India to
sign the NPT? It is unnecessary here to chronicle the extensive illegal transfers of
nuclear know how and equipment to Pakistan by China. These are well known.
However, we would restrict ourselves to quote one portion from the Chinese first defence
white paper of November 1995, which focussed on arms control and disarmament.
We quote
Since 1992 when it (China) became a party to the treaty,
it has strictly fulfilled all its obligations under the treaty .... China follows
three principles regarding nuclear exports serving peaceful use only, accepting IAEA's
safeguards and no retransfers to a third country.
Has China followed the three principles enunciated?
In a report of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency,
USA said that China "was the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and
technology to Pakistan" during the second half of 1996. (5)
In practice China has had scant regard for the provisions of the
NPT. In Feb. 1966 it was disclosed by the Washington Times that
the China National Nuclear Corporation, (State owned) transferred to the A.Q.Khan Research
Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, 5000 ring magnets, which can be used in gas centrifuges to
enrich uranium. The Kahuta facility is not under IAEA safeguards. (6)
The same Chinese firm sold a "a special Industrial
furnace" and "high-tech diagnostic equipment" to unsafe guarded nuclear
facilities in Pakistan. It is reported that the Chinese technicians themselves visited
Pakistan to install the equipment. (7)
It is also known that the Chinese built the entire research
reactor facility at Khusab (not under IAEA safe guards)and further diverted heavy water
meant for other safe guarded facilities to Kahuta to begin operations.
Indian Response:
India had been closely following the cooperation and clandestine
transfer of sensitive material from China to Pakistan. But whenever the matter of
transfer of nuclear or missile technology was taken up by India, there has been the
standard response that "China will not do or has not done anything that would go
against the interest of India." Even recently after the Pokhran II tests, the
Chinese have continued to maintain that China has not violated any treaty or laws in its
nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Indian efforts so far to enter in a strategic dialogue
on nuclear matters have also been rebuffed.
Why this illegal tranfer?
Many reasons have been given by various analysts for continued
violation of NPT in the matter of nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Some important
ones are
* China views a strong and independent Pakistan as
important in maintaining a balance of power favourable to itself in Southeast Asia and
thus China's security. (8)
India has a long history of cultural relations with the countries of south east Asia
and at no time in their history have these countries felt threatened by India. This
is not the case with China. Developments in the Mischief reef is one indication.
* Indian strategic objectives unfortunately were focussed
on the nuclear developments in Pakistan and the transfer of equipment, design and
technology from China and not in the larger context of Sino Indian relations.
Thus, China succeeded in keeping this focus purely in a regional context. It
is now increasingly felt by the Indian policy makers and at least from the time of
conclusion of CTBT in the CD and the UN General Assembly that India has a much larger
security perspective and cannot be "Pakistan centric" anymore. The testing
of a thermo nuclear device(9) and the test of Agni II have offset the unstated advantage
China had in the past of being the only nuclear weapon power in the Asian region. Could we
still believe that China is "unconcerned?"
If China could have a minimum deterrent, why not India?
Prof. Tanchung had said that after a long time in Chinese
history, China no longer feels threatened from the north (10). Our paper on
"Strategic culture and Grand strategy in Chinese history may be seen.
China and the former Soviet Union signed an "Agreement on
Principles Governing the Mutual Reduction of Military Forces and the Enhancement of
Confidence in the Military Field in the Border areas". Both China and Russia
have agreed "on no first use of nuclear weapons against each other and on not
targeting their respective strategic nuclear weapons at each other" Yet China
continues to have a large inventory of nuclear weaponry and delivery systems. While
repeating the need for total and global disarmament there is no move on the part of China
to reduce its arsenal, in keeping with Article VI of NPT. Although India and China
have concluded an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of
Actual Control in the Border areas (11), should China not concede the same deterrence
capability for India to safe guard its national interests?
China's nuclear ambitions:
China became the fifth nuclear state in 1964 with the succesful
test of its first nuclear device made with highly enriched Uranium at Lop Nor.
Within a short period, shorter than what US took, it conducted its multi stage thermo
nuclear test by June 1967. The Risk Report (12) quoting the Natural Resources
Defence Council's Nuclear Weapon Databook has said that China has tested and deployed six
different war head designs. Recent press reports indicate that China has vastly
improved the designs and the delivery systems with technology obtained unauthorisedly from
US laboratories.
Both in quality and quantity China is far ahead of India in
nuclear weaponisation. To seek parity with China would involve enormous outlay and
at great political and economic costs. It is not necessary either.
Civilian Nuclear programme:
The first Power reactor of China at Qingshan Zhejiang province
was completed in 1993 after many technical problems involving several visits of technical
experts from outside to provide safety measures. The Risk report quotes an US
government expert who tracks China's nuclear progress that "For years the Chinese
have said that the Qinshan reactors were entirely made in China which is a
lie." The pressure vessel for the reactor was imported from Japan and the
coolant pumps were from a German firm. The Qinshan type of reactor China was
building for Pakistan was delayed considerably as there were problems in procuring the
pressure vessel from abroad which finally was obtained from Japan after US
clearance. India makes its own pressure vessels. China is rapidly expanding
its power projects with outside help. These are
1. A start is being made in the constructions of two
VVER-1000 unis at Lianyungan on the basis of an agreement signed between Russia and China
in January this year.
2. A French led consortium has begun construction work at Ling Ao nuclear plant at
Daya Bay and commercial operation is expected to begin in July 2002.
3. Four other units, Qinshan Phase 2 with two units and Qinshan Phase 3 with two
more units of CANDU type (Canadian help). For Phase 2 of Qinshan, Mitsubishi is building
the pressure vessel for the first unit.
It could be seen that China is still dependent on western countries for some of the vital
components of the reactors. With western countries vying with each other to
provide China with the know how, the gap between India and China in civilian nuclear
technology will soon be closed. India is therefore justified in seeking access to
advanced technology in return for adhering to the provisions of the CTBT and stopping
further production of fissile material (FMCT).
Chinese Nukes towards India:
Recent Press Reports indicate that China has redeployed its
missiles towards India after the Agni II tests. This itself is enough justification
for India to go ahead with Agni III tests. Unless India has a viable and credible
deterrence against China, no meaningful dialogue with China on strategic accommodation
between the two countries is possible.
Dr.
S.Chandrasekharan. 19th
May, 1999.
Notes:
1. In a seminar at IIC of the Institute of Peace and
Conflict studies. We ignore here a visit by a Congress I delegation led by Mr. Natwar
Singh to China. This visit was more a result of internal political compulsions than
on Sino Indian relations as such.
2. Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, "China and a Fissile Material Production
Cut-off", Survival, vol. 37.,no.4 1995-1996, p.156
3. Tong Xuan, "Youyige Hedaguo ze Jueqi-Indu de Helliang ji Fazhan
Zhuangkuang", Nanya Yanjiu Jikan, February 1987.
4. Ibid. Lisbeith Gronlund and David Wright. P. 157, in a private communication with
participants of ISODARCO, Beijing Arms control seminar.
5. Director of Central Intelligence, The Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions-July-December 1996, June
1997.
6. Shirley A.Kan .,CRS papers, 92056: Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Current Policy Issues updated June 1, 1998.
7. Ibid., Shirley Kan.
8. John. W.Garver, "China and South Asia", The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 519, January 1992. Pp. 67-85
9. Unconfirmed reports indicate that soon after Pokhran II tests, the Foreign
Secretary of Pakistan in his visit to Beijing sought a " thermo nuclear device"
for testing purposes to show parity with India. This was turned down. It may
be recalled that China turned down an earlier request to test the Pakistani device at Lop
Nor.
10. In a private conversation with the writer.
11. These are referred to in the white paper of China.
12. Risk Report, Vol.9, November 1995. , "China's nuclear ambition grows."
