NEW POLITICAL CRISIS IN RUSSIA
The dismissal of Yevgeny Primakov as the Russian
Prime Minister by President Boris Yeltsin on May12, a day before the beginning of the
debate in the Duma on the motion for impeachment against Yeltsin, was widely expected.
Since January, there had been indications
that Yeltsin was greatly concerned over the increasing popularity of Primakov to the
detriment of his own popularity. Despite Primakov's repeated denials of any Presidential
aspirations, Yeltsin's suspicions that Primakov was using his popularity and Yeltsin's
repeated spells of inactivity due to illness to undermine the President's authority were
fuelled by the members of his family concerned over the vigorous enquiries into
allegations of financial wrong-doings by them and by the so-called liberal elements, which
had immensely profited from the economic reforms.
These elements projected Primakov's call
for reinforcing central authority through constitutional amendments in order to abolish
the election of regional Governors and for corrections in the present policy of economic
reforms "in order to place emphasis on the (hitherto neglected) social aspects of
reforms and to increase the role of the State in the economy where it is
indispensable" ("Newsweek", March 22) as indications of the proximity of
his ideological thinking to that of the Communists.
The concerns of Yeltsin's family and the
coterie surrounding them first surfaced in January when the investigative agencies began
enquiries into alleged financial irregularities in the oil company Sibneft and the
Aeroflot, with which Boris Berezovsky, one of the seven oligarchs, who had funded
Yeltsin's Presidential campaign, is associated. Berezovsky is a close personal friend of
Yeltsin and his politically influential daughter, Tatyan.
Berezovsky retaliated by starting an
anti-Primakov campaign in the printed and electronic media controlled by him. Berezovsky's
media group levelled allegations of corruption against close associates of Primakov in his
Cabinet and accused Primakov of harbouring Presidential ambitions and of trying to
undermine Yeltsin's authority in collusion with the Communists.
There was further misunderstanding in the
beginning of February when Primakov tried to negotiate with the anti-Yeltsin Deputies in
the Duma a compromise under which they would drop their impeachment motion against Yeltsin
and agree to provide immunity against investigation and prosecution to Yeltsin and his
family in return for an assurance by Yeltsin that he would not dismiss Primakov or
dissolve the Duma.
On coming to know of these negotiations,
which had started during one of the spells of illness of Yeltsin, he immediately
repudiated the initiative of Primakov and his spokesman stated categorically that under no
circumstances would the President give up his constitutional powers to change the Prime
Minister and to dissolve the Duma. Though Primakov projected his initiative as an attempt
to pre-empt any political instability due to the impeachment proceedings and to prevent
any witch-hunting of the President and his family, Primakov's critics projected it as a
cunning attempt to ensure that he (Primakov) would not be disturbed in office so that he
could strengthen his political base before next year's Presidential elections.
Matters were further aggravated in the
middle of February when the Council on Defence and Foreign Policy, which consists of 150
leading politicians, businessmen and journalists, brought out a report titled "About
An Exit from the Crisis".
The report referred to the political and
economic difficulties facing the country and called for the voluntary resignation of
Yeltsin so that premature presidential elections could be held. It said: "To wait for
elections in 2000 would bedangerous."
Sergei Karaganov, Chairman of the Council,
said that Russia was facing a graver threat than in 1991, when hardline communists
launched a putsch or in 1993, when Yeltsin ordered the shelling of the Supreme Soviet.
The report projected Primakov, a personal
friend of Karaganov, as the country's best hope for pulling it out of its present crisis.
Though Primakov distanced himself from the
report, it further added to the suspicions of Yeltsin and his family. Thereafter, there
was persistent speculation in Moscow that Yeltsin had made up his mind to sack Primakov
and that it was only a question of time before he did so.
This speculation stopped temporarily on
March 5, when Yeltsin sacked Berezovsky who had started the anti-Primakov campaign through
his media empire, from the post of Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). Though the dismissal was made on the ground that Berezovsky had exceeded his
responsibilities and failed to implement Yeltsin's instructions, it was widely seen as a
victory for Primakov.
The political truce, however, proved to be
short-lived. In the beginning of April, the issue of arrest warrants by Yuri Skuratov, the
Prosecutor-General, against Berezovsky and Alexander Smolensky, another oligarch, who had
funded Yeltsin's election campaign, and the launching of investigations by Skuratov into
the links of Yeltsin's family with Mabetex, a Swiss construction company, further poisoned
the atmosphere.
The appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin by
Yeltsin as his special envoy to bring about peace in Yugoslavia, thereby taking the
subject out of the hands of Primakov, was interpreted as a calculated snub to Primakov.
The downward slide in the relations between the two could not thereafter be arrested and
led to the dismissal of Primakov and his Cabinet and to the appointment of Sergei
Stepashin, the Interior Minister, as the interim Prime Minister till confirmed by the
Duma.
Like Primakov, Stepashin was also a
professional intelligence officer. The two served in the Committee of State Security, also
known as the KGB, before 1991. The KGB was responsible for external as well as internal
intelligence and security. While Primakov served in the external intelligence section,
Stepashin was in the internal division.
The KGB widely used non-diplomatic covers
for its external intelligence operatives-- such as academics, journalists etc. Throughout
his career, Primakov had served in such non-diplomatic cover posts . He was on the staff
of the Institute of Oriental Studies of Moscow in which capacity he had visited India on a
couple of occasions to participate in seminars. He also worked in the news division of
Moscow radio and TV and as the West Asia correspondent of the "Pravda" in the
late 1960s. He became a close personal friend of Presidents Hafez Assad of Syria and
Saddam Hussein of Iraq.
He strongly supported Gorbachev's policy of
political liberalisation and, at the same time, maintained good personal relations with
Yeltsin. Just after the abortive putsch of 1991, Gorbachev appointed him as the head of
the KGB, in which post Yeltsin retainedim.
In 1993, Yeltsin abolished the KGB and set
up two different intelligence organisations to deal with external and internal
intelligence and security. He made Primakov the Director-General of the Foreign
Intelligence Service (FIS) and Stepashin the Director-General of the internal intelligence
organisation called initially the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service (FCIS) and
subsequently re-named in April, 1995, as the Federal Security Service (FSS).
Primakov was appointed as Foreign Minister
in January1996, in place of the pro-US Andrei Kozyrev and as Prime Minister in September
last.
Widely-read and widely travelled, Primakov
was a fascinating mix of natural shyness and cultivated finesse in his interactions with
his colleagues and subordinates and with foreign personalities. While anyone who met him
in a large party would hardly remember him thereafter, people who had an opportunity of
interacting with him on a one-to-one basis did not fail to come away totally fascinated by
his personal warmth, relaxed style of speaking, wide knowledge and depth of understanding.
After taking over as the chief of the FIS,
he developed it into a lean and efficient organisation, placing emphasis on improving the
quality of its analysis and downgrading the priority attached to covert actions. Even his
worst critics praised his integrity and he came to be known as a man of pragmatism and
flexibility. Observers in Moscow feel that had he continued as the chief of the FSS also,
he would have handled Chechnya differently instead of in the rigid ham-handed manner in
which Stepashin handled it.
Both Primakov and Stepashin attributed the
ills of post-1991 Russia to the weakening of central authority. While Primakov expressed
his views on the subject in guarded language, Stepashin, as the chief of the then FCIS in
1993-95, never minced his words.
Stepashin used to lament that the post-1991
Russia had become a "self-castrated state." According to him, Russia had
castrated itself thrice-- by prematurely introducing political pluralism, by letting
central authority be weakened and by diluting the powers of the intelligence agencies.
While Primakov kept his FIS under a tight
leash, Stepashin, during his tenure, tried to build the FSS in the image of the KGB and
managed to convince Yeltsin on the need for a powerful and active internal intelligence
and security service.
During an address to Stepashin's officers
on May 26,1993, Yeltsin said, to the satisfaction of Stepashin: " Whatever changes
take place in Russia and the world, it will be a very long time before intelligence
officers find themselves out of work."
He persuaded Yeltsin to revive the
notorious Directorate of Special Operations of the KGB and attach it to the FSS on June
10,1993. Its revival was sought to be justified by Yeltsin on grounds of economic
security.
Yeltsin said: "The time has come for
the Government to work out a strategy of Russia's economic security. Counterintelligence
must act selectively in the economic sphere….It is necessary to preserve progressive
economic, scientific and technical potential….This is a task not only for science,
industry and foreign economic departments. For this, the special services must also make
an effort."
Stepashin is a typical internal security
expert, who tends to smell a rat everywhere. Long before Malaysia's Prime Minister
Dr.Mahatir Mohammad had suspected George Soros of being responsible for causing the
South-East Asian currency turmoil of 1997 to allegedly punish the ASEAN countries for
admitting Myanmar into the organisation, Stepashin had reportedly told Yeltsin in a report
of January, 1995, that he strongly suspected that the CIA used Soros for destabilising the
currency and stock markets of countries resisting US foreign and economic policies. The
report also named a large number of academics, think-tanks and non-governmental
organisations of the US as the CIA's surrogates.
Known for his rigidity of approach,
Stepashin, along with Pavel Grachev, the then Defence Minister, and Nikolai Yegorov , the
then Minister for Nationalities, had largely contributed to the Chechnya mess in 1994-95
which led to his subsequent replacement from the FSS. But, he managed to rehabilitate
himself with Yeltsin.
Stepashin's tenure in the FSS also saw the
signing of a protocol by the FBI and the then FCIS in July,1994, providing for a hotline
between the chiefs of the two services, for the training of FCIS officers at the FBI
Academy at Quantico, Virginia, and for the opening of an FBI office in Moscow.
The protocol was signed during a visit to
Moscow in the first week of July 1994, by Louis Freeh, the FBI Director.
If Yeltsin has decided to confront the
Duma, dissolve it for failing to approve his new nominee as PM thrice and rule by decree,
he might have calculated that Stepashin would be the right person to carry out his orders.
It remains to be seen whether his faith in Stepashin is well-placed.
The liberal elements, which were critical
of Primakov, have welcomed the appointment of Stepashin. In an interview over the CNN on
May 12, Anatoly Chubais former Deputy PM, described Stepashin as a leader of the new
generation of politicians who would carry Russia forward on the path of democratic and
economic reforms. This could prove to be an over-optimistic view.
B.RAMAN
(13-5-99)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,and,
presently, Director, Institute for Topical studies, Chennai. )
