On April
11,1999, India announced the successful test-firing of the Agni II missile with the
following features:
- It is a two-stage intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with
a mobile launch capability and can cover a range of over 2,000 km in 11 minutes.
- 20 metres long, weighs 16 tonnes, has a solid propulsion system
and is designed to carry a "special weapons" payload of over 1,000 kgs.
- It has sophisticated on-board packages and an advanced
communications interface.
The Government of India also announced
that Pakistan, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany and Japan
were given prior information of the proposed test-firing on April 9. International
airlines and shipping services were also given prior notice to prevent any accidents.
In a broadcast
to the nation the same night, the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, said:
" As was the case with the nuclear tests at Pokhran in May last year, the test-firing
of the Agni missile is also a purely defensive step. It is not meant for aggression
against any nation. Rather, Agni is proof of our determination to strengthen our national
security so comprehensively that we can defend ourselves. I have said earlier, and I
reiterate, that India remains committed to minimum deterrence, to no first-use of nuclear
weapons and never to use them against non-nuclear weapon states."
He also said
that the test was conducted in accordance with established international practices and was
part of the Integrated Missile Development Programme. He further said that India
could not depend on others to defend her and added: " We have to develop our own
indigenous capabilities. " Briefing pressmen, George Fernandes, the Indian
Defence Minister, said: "The Agni test has added a new dimension to our defence
capabilities which have reached a point where no one from anywhere will dare to threaten
us. He also said that the Agni missile had now reached a point of operationalisation .
However, he did not comment on the production and deployment aspects.
Till February
1994, there had been three "technology demonstrator" tests of the Agni missile
and the April 11,1999, test was the first operational demonstrator test.
The following aspects of the
test need to be underlined:
- It marked a clear rejection by India of the post-Pokhran calls
from the US and other permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as from Germany
and Japan for the non-weaponisation of India's nuclear capability and for the
non-production of the required delivery capability.
- It marked a significant step forward towards India's stated
objective of a minimum nuclear deterrence in accordance with India's perceptions of a
possible nuclear threat to it.
- While pains were taken not to name any country as the motivating
factor of India's action in acquiring this IRBM capability, it was essentially meant to
give India a deterrent capability against China should the relations take a turn for the
worse in the future.
- As in the past, this test too was over the sea in order to avoid
any danger to the civilian population and the required advance warnings were given to
airlines and shipping services. In keeping with the understanding reached during the
summit meeting of the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan
at Lahore in February, Pakistan was informed in advance. In addition, the five permanent
members of the Security Council, Japan and Germany were also informed. India's
missile tests had never been clandestine and advance warnings had always been given to
airlines and shipping services.
- Agni II is a totally indigenous product and the test was a prelude
to its serial production and deployment.
Before discussing the Pakistani response, certain aspects of the
Pakistani missile programme have to be highlighted:
- Past Pakistani tests, including that of the Ghauri I missile in
April, 1998, were clandestine.
- The tests were not of missiles produced indigenously, but of
missiles secretly procured from China (M-11) and North Korea ( NODONG II ) in a
ready-to-deploy and use form. These missiles had already been successfully test-fired
in China and North Korea. The missiles were given Pakistani names
and fired not to test them ,but to reassure the Pakistani population and to impress India
that Pakistan already has a matching capability to the indigenous missiles being developed
by India.
- Since Pakistan had been vehemently denying the Chinese/North
Korean origin of these missiles, it had to take precautions to prevent any part of the
missile falling into the hands of US and other Western powers after the impact, a
possibility which is likely if the missiles were to be fired over the sea.
- Therefore, at considerable risk to its population, Pakistan
carried out its tests over land to ensure that the point of impact would be inside
Pakistani territory. This also obviated the need for alerting foreign airlines and
shipping services.
The Agni II test elicited the
expected Pakistani reiteration of its determination to give a matching response to
India. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif told a press conference at Lahore on April 13:
"Whatever the Indians wanted to do, they have done and they can be sure we will not
compromise on our defence capabilities. Whatever we have in mind we will do and we will
fulfill our obligation (to the Pakistani people)." Simultaneously, there were reports
that Pakistan had informed India of its intention to test-fire its own missile and that
the Pakistani response might be in the form of firing of two missiles--Ghauri II and
Shaheen.
On the morning of
April 14, Pakistan announced the successful firing of Ghauri II, an IRBM with a
claimed range of over 2,000 KMs and capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. At the time of
the recording of this note, no further details of the missile are available; nor is there
any information about the expected firing of the Shaheen.
The
following comments are possible on the basis of the information available at the time of
recording this note:
- As with Ghauri I, Ghauri II was also fired over land from a mobile
launcher and not over the sea.
- It was fired from the Nathwala village in the Tilla ranges on the
fringes of the Bunha river. The test ranges of the Armour Fighting Vehicles (AFV) are
located to the north-west of this village, which is near Jhelum. The AFV ranges have
been placed under the control of the Kahuta Research Labs. Ghauri I was also fired
from the same ranges.
Pakistan was
reported to have bought from North Korea---partly for cash, partly for foodgrains and
partly for fertilisers-- 12 Nodong II missiles-- with a range of 1,500 kms, a payload of
1,000 kgs, and a circular error probability of 800 metres. The missile is 15.5 metres
long, with a diameter of 1.3 metres and a fuel (liquid) load of 16,000 kgs. It was first
flight-tested by North Korea in 1995.
After the
arrival of this consignment, the Kahuta Research Labs fired one of the 12 missiles under
the name Ghauri I on April 6,1998. Briefing pressmen after the firing, A.Q.Khan, the head of Pakistan's clandestine project for the procurement
of nuclear and missile capabilities from abroad, stated that Ghauri I had covered a
distance of 1,100 kms from near Jhelum in Punjab to Nushki in Balochistan in 8 minutes and
carried a payload of 700 kgs only as against its capacity of 1,000 kgs. He also added that
though the missile had a potential range of 1,500 kms, they fired it over a trajectory of
1,100 kms only to ensure that it impacted in Pakistani land territory and not in the sea.
It is too early
to identify the parentage of Ghauri II until one gets more details of its parameters. If
Pakistani claim of a range of above 2,000 kms is correct, it could be the Taepo Dong I
missile which is actually the Nodong II with the added boost of a Scud C. It was
flight-tested by North Korea in 1997 and was used for the launching of a satellite by
North Korea on August 31,1998, during which Pakistani missile experts were present.
After Pakistan's
Chagai nuclear tests last year, there was a war of words between A.Q.Khan and Dr.Samar
Mubarak Mand of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission as to who should get the
credit for the successful tests. The two scientists, in their attempts to convince
pressmen, about their importance in the Pakistani nuclear and missile establishment, gave
out a lot of details regarding the missile programme.
According to
Dr.Mubarak Mand, in addition to the Kahuta Research Lab of A.Q.Khan, the National Defence
Complex (NDC) of which Dr.Mand is the Director-General, has also been entrusted with the
responsibility of developing missiles. Whereas the Kahuta Lab was responsible for
developing missiles with liquid fuel (North Korean), the NDC was responsible for missiles
with solid fuel (Chinese). The NDC was developing two missiles called Shaheen I (700 kms ) and Shaheen II (2,000 Kms). While Shaheen I had already been
ground-tested and was ready for flight-testing, Shaheen II was still in the design stage.
According to
Dr.A.Q.Khan, Nawaz Sharif did not want the Ghauri I to be flight-tested. (Author's
comment: Presumably because he was afraid that this would reveal to the world Pakistan's
missile and nuclear collaboration with North Korea). Nawaz wanted only the Shaheen to be
flight-tested, but two tests failed. Thereafter, Nawaz asked A.Q.Khan to fire Ghauri I.
Pakistan has so
far test-fired three other missiles---Hatf I (Range 77 Kms, Payload 500 kgs ) in 1988,
Hatf II (Range 250 Kms and payload 500 kgs) in 1989 and Hatf III (Range variously stated at between 600 and 800 kms and payload 500 Kgs) on
July 3,1997. According to Gen. (Retd) Mirza Aslam Beg, former Chief of the Army Staff,
Hatf II is actually a free-flight rocket with an inertial guidance system and Hatf
III has a two-stage rocket with a war head separation mechanism, which can carry five
different types of warheads, a terminal guidance system and a circular error probability
of 0.1 per cent. ("Dawn" of April 27, 1998) These missiles were developed
and tested by the Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission--SUPARCO.
B.RAMAN
14-4-99
(The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and presently, Director, Institute for Topical studies,
Chennai,
E- mail: corde@vsnl.com)
