The Indo–Pak talks in November 98 have once again
demonstrated that the relations are doomed by an irresolvable equation. However it is a
matter of historical record that many problems or equations in mathematics or otherwise
regarded as insoluble, do get resolved. It takes a genius to do so and the time taken for
success cannot be pre-determined. It seems many a genius will be necessary to deal
successfully with the complexities of India –Pakistan relations. And the time factor
will of course remain indeterminate.
Unfortunately these complexities are becoming worse. New factors
are creeping in which make the task more difficult for an ordinary genius.
The roots of the problem are to be found in the very basis on
which the two new nations India and Pakistan where carved from British India. Since then,
India has evolved into a democratic and secular state. Its concerns today are largely
related to development and social transformation. A broad sense of nationalism pervades
the entire country. Its parliamentary mechanisms and constitutional guarantees allow
dissent and disaffection to be approached through debate and compromise. In Pakistan, on
the other hand some of the fundamentals of a national architecture are sadly missing. Its
own choice to remain a theocratic state imposes on it the burden of some awesome hurdles.
Kashmir, therefore becomes the irresolvable issue over which
Pakistan cannot compromise. The fundamentalists in the country which include in their
broad sweep influential sections of the armed forces will not let any government in
Pakistan stay in power even for a day if it were to appear that a compromise on Kashmir
was in the offing. The reactions in India over such a possibility would be no less
explosive. Any government in India which displays any responsiveness to the idea of a
trade off is likely to have the entire opposition at its throat. This is not withstanding
the fact that responsible political and military opinion in both the countries are said to
believe that concessions and adjustments are absolutely necessary to achieve credible
progress in relations between the two countries.
Today Pakistan is paying a price for its policies on Kashmir
which by any prudent consideration should be considered unacceptable. Its military
expenditures have long ago reached almost unbearable levels. Its pursuit of a nuclear
deterrent can be traced to its sense of non security over Kashmir. Its nuclear explosions
of May 98 which are predicated by the same approach and consequent policies have landed it
into a state of virtual bankruptcy. The American pressures are ironically compelling it to
move deeper in the direction of religious fundamentalism. Such developments are not
conducive to the promotion of social cohesion or national integrity. And yet despite
observing its progressive deterioration and decay no government in Pakistan has been able
to dismount from the tiger of Kashmir attachment for fearing of being devoured.
The costs to India seem manageable and therefore do not impose an
imperative for a a change in policy. The Indian limits for tolerance are well with in the
acceptable threshold. The Pakistanis can see all this but keep hoping that some miracle
will alter the situation to their advantage. The nuclear explosions of May 98 seen as an
affront to American policies on non proliferation have given Pakistan what it considers to
be a new opportunity to put Kashmir on the centre stage of world attention as potential
area for serious tension. The reactions of the UN Security Council, P5 and G8 apart from
certain statements of President Mandela of South Africa and UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan can be assumed to have bolstered Pakistani spirits. In this background the Pakistani
delegation for the November 98 talks could have had only one brief to harp on the need for
peace and security in the context of Kashmir and not to allow any progress on any other
matter. And this is exactly what happened. The talks were predetermined from the Pakistani
side not to have any results. And yet the routine would continue for the benefit of
international observers in whose eyes Pakistan does not wish to appear recalcitrant.
The Pakistani political will today therefore is to stall any
meaningful progress in the dialogue with India. Such a will is clearly visible from the
reported discussions in November 98 talks on two subjects, Siachen and economic
cooperation. The stand–off in the icy barrens of Siachen is to nobody's advantage and
can be and should be called off without loss to anyone. Pakistan rejected Indian
confidence building measures for calling of mortar and artillery exchanges. It is to be
noted that the line of actual control in Kashmir ends at point NJ 9842 and beyond that
which is the Siachen area, it is supposed to run northwards. At one time the Pakistani
leadership was believed willingly to abide by this imaginary line northwards beyond NJ
9842 but is no longer willing to do so. In matters of trade Pakistan is bound to extend to
India the MFN status under WTO regulations. However Pakistani authoriites seem to assess
that the fundamentalist opinion in Pakistan would not approve of it and, therefore refrain
from responding to the Indian gesture of giving that status to Pakistan.
Perhaps the only positive gains from the November 98 talks were
the agreements to allow a bus service between Lahore and Delhi and examine sale of power
to India. But t should not surprise anyone if Pakistan ultimately finds itself to be
without the political will to push these two innocuous arrangements. The other questions a
t the talks viz. Wullar Barrage, Tulbul Navigation project and Sir Creek needed only
technical clarifications and adjustments to be taken out of the way. But the Pakistani
brief was not to allow any headway. The remaining question was of terrorism and proxy war.
As was to be expected Pakistan denied any role in it.
It is going to be a long wait before the mood in Pakistan towards
India undergoes a change. Another half a century may not also be enough.
(Mr. A.K.Verma is a former Secretary of Cabinet
Secretariat.)
12-12-98
